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Abstract
This work fits into the wider framework of the on-going debate centered on Passive System
reliability. Its aim is to provide insights into the design of a dependable method to evaluate the
reliability of Passive Systems.
In order to achieve this, a method is proposed that focuses on the identification of the
fundamental parameters that are critical in leading the system to failure. The selection of these
parameters was done through the use of Latin Hypercube Sampling (LHS) combined with an
analysis centered on the use of two statistical tools, Logistic Regression and the Classification
Tree. The results yielded by this study, made it necessary to perform a systematic statistical
evaluation of the efficiency of the LHS when used in the context of sensitivity analyses. The
study was conducted via the visual and statistical investigation of the scatter-plots derived from
the propagation of the uncertainties associated with the fundamental parameters of the plant.
In order to validate the proposed method, two examples involving a Gas Fast Reactor (GFR)
plant have been set up. The two examples differ, among other aspects, in the number of
realizations, M, used to carry out the analyses.
The first example - used to illustrate the method - is a representation of the core derived from
the application of System Dynamics modeling.
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The second example is a RELAP5-3D model of a two-loop passive Decay Heat Removal
system of the GFR. This case was designed in order to test the method in a more realistic
scenario.
Important findings about the applicability of the method as a function of M, are given by way
of comparison between the results obtained from the two cases. The results reveal that the
numbers of realizations, provided by LHS, are insufficient when used to predict and interpret the
propagation of the failures in the plant. The second important conclusion is that the resulting
Probability of Failure (PF), for low values of M, does not converge to an accurate estimate. The
implications of these findings are investigated trough a third study.
The third example is a purely mathematical model specifically designed to test the
assumptions made for the first two cases. It provides additional analysis on Examples I and II
offering further support for the findings from the two.
The results attained by this work suggest that further studies of this kind should be conducted
in this area.
THESIS SUPERVISOR: Michal W. Golay
TITLE: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
THESIS READER: George E. Apostolakis
TITLE: Professor of Nuclear Science and Engineering
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NOMENCLATURE
T-H = Thermal Hydraulics
CT= Classification Tree
LR=Logistic Regression
LHS =Latin Hypercube Sampling
GFR=Gas Fast Reactor
SSCP=Systems Strucures Components
Phenomena
RMPS = Reliability Measures for Passive
Systems
PSR = Passive Sytem's Reliability
PF = Probability of Failure
M = Number of Realizations
Ns = Number of Systems
PS = Passive System
DHR = Deacay Heat Removal System
ECCS = Emergency Core Cooling System
HXC = Heat Exchanger
AHP = Analytical Hierarchy Process
PEPSR = Parameters Evaluation for
Passive System's Reliability
PSA = Probabilistic Safety Assessment
SM= Safety Margins
MC= Monte Carlo
PRA= Probabilistic Risk Assessment
IAEA = International Atomic Energy Agency
SD = System Dynamics
PDF = Probability Density Function
SPX = Super Phenix
LWR = Light Water Reactor
LOCA = Loss of Coolant Accident
GFRDYN_LUMPED = lumped model of the
GFR during transients
PCS = Power Conversion System
FAST = Fourier Amplitude Sensitivity Test
FPI = Fast Probability Integration.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Organization of the Work
This chapter presents an overview of the main topics discussed in this work. The present
chapter is divided into three parts.
The first section describes the features of the plant used in Examples I and II, the former of
which was specifically created in order to validate the method proposed later on in the document.
The second part describes the core part of an overall model, developed with a special modeling
technique named System Dynamics, and provides also details of the reference scenario analyzed
with special emphasis to the passive systems utilized to remove the decay heat in the event of an
accident. The third section provides general information about the different modeling techniques
used to carry out the analyses performed in Chapter 3.
Chapter 2 moves the discussion towards the wider debate centered on the need for an
overall method that would cover all the questions connected with passive system's reliability.
After a brief overview of the supervised learning methods and their assumed applicability to
reliability studies, we discuss an overall methodology to account for some of the typical
problems encountered in Passive System's reliability studies. The core of this chapter focuses
mainly on investigating the use of Classification Trees in order to predict the failure probability
of the plant more rigorously, and to determine a possible ranking criterion of the parameters of
interest.
Chapter 3 provides the set of examples used to validate the suggested method code along
with a few observations on the subject. Final conclusions, future work and suggestions on how to
broaden the field of applicability to wider and more complex engineering problems are given at
the end of this Chapter.
References and appendixes, containing the source codes and detailed simulation results, are
presented at the end of this document.
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1.1 The Gas Fast Reactor Plant
The nuclear plant that has been selected for our analyses is the Gas Fast Reactor, GFR, of
2400 MWth that is under design at MIT (see Figure 1). While the research presented in this work
deals mainly with the natural circulation DHR systems, it is equally important to define and
understand the complete design of the Gas-cooled Fast Reactor (GFR) design.
The reactor is planned to use the carbon dioxide as coolant and term vector fluid at a nominal
pressure of 20 MPa with an inlet temperature of 480 "C during normal operations. The plant is
constituted by the Emergency Core Cooling System, ECCS, the core, the vessel, the Power
Conversion Units, PCUs, the Core and the Containment plus the active systems used to remove
the heat in the first minutes of a severe accident. A comprehensive list of all major components
of the plant is summarized by Table 1.
Figure 1: 1200 MWe direct stacked cycle isometric and top view views.
The entire system operates as one passive system whose initiation is triggered by the
reactor scram after a Loss-of-Coolant Accident (LOCA).
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Table 1: Status of GFR Plant Features as of July 2007
Subsystem Features Comments
Core
Fuel U0 2 + BeO LWRTRU fissile ± MA
Clad ODS-MA956,orHT-9 SiC a long range possibility
Configuration tube-in-duct fuel assemblies, pin-type core as fallback
"hexnut" pellets, vented,
Thermal-Hydraulics axial peaking factor _ 1.3 Vary BeO fraction to
radial peaking factor < flatten power. Lower
1.2 power density - 85 than GA GCFR of
W/cc 1970's( 235 W/cc
Burnup > 120MWd/kg(avg) In single batch no-
reshuffle core, 17-yr
Safety Systems
Aux. Loops combined shutdown & emergency, Based on RELAP parallel
3 or 4 x 100% capable, active loop calculations. For P>0.7
forced convection; but passive MPa natural convection
natural convection supplemented; alone may suffice
water boiler heat sink
Emergency Power Fuel cells to supplement diesels Projected to be more reliable
than diesels alone in long
Plant
Power Conversion supercritical CO2 Brayton AGRs in UK use CO2
System (PCS) direct 2 x 600 MWe coolant at 4 MPa and have
loops=1200MWe; 650 0 C core T-650 0C
exit/turbine inlet, pressure: 20
Reactor Vessel PCIV Vessel houses loop isolation
and check valves plus
shutdown cooling heat
Containment PWR type, steel liner reinforced CO 2 can be added to adjust
concrete 0.7 MPa design pressure. Internally
capability 70,000 m3 free volume insulated
filtered/vented
H2 production by steam Separate water boiler loops (4) @ Water boiler loops can also
electrolysis (optional) 10% of reactor power Recuperation serve for self-powered
of H2 & 02 heat allows cell decay heat removal
operation at 8500 C
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1.2 Plant Modeling
The following Sections provide the list of equations used in the modeling phase of the
GFR core. This section is extracted from a more complicate model which is currently in phase of
construction at MIT. The model has been named GFRDYN_LUMPED model for its capability to
simulate dynamically the GFR plant (containment, core and the DHR passive system) during the
reference accident (in this case a Loss of Coolant Accident, LOCA). The model has been built by
modeling the minimum number of nodes necessary to consider the interaction between the sub-
systems which compose it. A visualization of the model in form of a sketch, which emphasizes
the loops followed by the coolant in the accident sequence, is given in Figure 2.
In this work, only a portion of the overall model presented in the figure has been selected;
the core sub-module has been preferred to portrait the transient which occurs during a LOCA and
therefore "disconnected" from the remaining part of the model. The following Sections introduce
first introduce the equations which has been used to model the GFR core in accident scenario,
then focuses on the uncertainties around the parameters introduced in the modeling phase, and
lastly describes in the detail the reasons behind the choice of the reference scenario and the
results obtained from it.
Figure 2: Loop diagram of the GFR plant. The diagram highlights the
different loops generated by a 5 nodes representation of the plant.
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1.2.1 The GFR Core
In this section we describe the core of the GFR as it behaves during an accident. A simple
set of differential equations describes the temporal evolution of the main variables interesting
from a dynamic point of view. During any accident or operational scenario the two dominant
conditions for the core are to keep the pressure drop low in order to favor natural circulation
capability, and, to keep the maximum temperature of the core below the limit imposed by the
cladding material.
Core geometry is optimized in order to get high power density, and the composition of
fuel is chosen in order to achieve self-sustainable breeding. However, because the interest here is
accident conditions, we won't deal with these features, but will focus on those parameters which
are significant in the accident scenario evolution considered and whose uncertainties could play a
major role to the final core's temperature determination: the decay heat curve, the core heat
capacity, the core hot spot or peaking factor and the overall heat transfer coefficient. In addition,
initial conditions will be considered as a major source of uncertainty as due to specific choice of
selecting a particular time frame within the accidental sequence. This last observation will be
clarified later in this work.
The set of equations which describes the transfer of heat from the fuel to the gas flowing
in the core and then successively extracted from the core is given by the set of equations reported
in the next page. The set of equations provides the temporal evolution of the main heat rates and
temperatures within the core. The measured output is the difference between the temperature of
the cladding and the maximum allowable for the material composing it. The difference measures
the safety margins for the considered system.
The description of the system which follows is given in light of the representation of the
final system which is going to be seen as the sum of closed circles, or loops, connected to the
core. This representation is typical of System Dynamics systems which are characterized by the
presence of feedbacks among the main variables. This representation revealed to be suitable also
from a thermal hydraulic perspective and helped in the conceptualization of the final plant's
system, seen as the sum of two main T-H circuits passing through the core (The core can be
visualized as the 1--)2 segment of Figure 2 on the overall loop connecting it to the ECCS
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system). The final representation obtained is coherent with the schematizations used to model the
T-H of nuclear power plants [Kazimi and Todreas, 1990].
dQc C dTEq
= CQ = cp, Mco = Qo -Q Eq. 1dt o dt
Qg,co-Qg,extr •c-g,co , Mg,.c (dT o / dt) Eq. 2
Qg,co = Uco-g -Aco (co - Tg,o) Eq. 3
Qg,extr = mg,co. Cp,g (To., -T) = mo Cp,g (T2 -T) Eq. 4
Tg.o = (To,, (t - r) + T,) / 2 = (T(t- r) 2 + T)/2 Eq. 5
Qd =Q0o a-b Eq. 6
The set of equations, describes the core of the GFR. More generally it can be seen as a
cascade of processes where the heat generated by the decay rate, Qd, which is the heat generated
in the fuel's core, is transferred from one process to the other. The first process, see Eq. 1, is the
exchange of this heat with the gas contained in the core and the difference between these two
rates is the heat which remain stored in the fuel's core. The heat then flows outside the core: the
difference between the heat which is transferred from fuel to the gas coolant, Qg,co, and the heat
extracted from the core, Qg,extr, measures the amount of heat which remains in the core's
channels and this is given by Eq. 2. The rate at which the heat is transferred from fuel to the gas
coolant, Qg,co, is driven by the difference between the temperature of the fuel in the core, Tco,
and the temperature of the gas in the channel, Tg,co, by men of the proportional factor Uco-
gAco. This factor is decomposed in the area of the surface through which the heat is exchanged
and the overall heat transfer coefficient, Uco-g, which is going to be analyzed in detail in the
next sections, as given by Eq. 3. The last two equations provide respectively, the average
temperature of the core, which has been described by mean of the average between the inlet and
the outlet temperatures, and the decay heat rate, as given by the ANS 79 decay heat formula.
Note that the temperature at the outlet is delayed by the time needed by the gas to travel within
the core, and that the decay heat formula is an exogenous input to the model. The next Sections
describe how to gather the characteristic parameters contained in the above equations starting
from the decay constants of Eq. 6.
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Decay Heat Curves
Because the decay heat represents the fundamental source of heat which is at the basis of the
behavior observed during the LOCA (the system wouldn't evolve in time without it), attention is
required to its definition, and dealing with the uncertainties related to it.
The decay heat curve depends on the composition of the fuel. In case of the GFR under study
at MIT, only preliminary studies are available, thus we opted to choose the experimental data
coming from the Super-Phenix, SPX, reactor, which is similar in its fuel composition and thus it
haves comparable fission products. The type of model used to draw the decay curve is the ANS
79 used with the data provided by the Super-Phenix decay heat curve reported in Table 2.
Table 2: Fraction of nominal power for the Super-Phenix reactor. Source: NT-SERI/LCSI/03/4005.
time(h) time(day) SPX(%)
hours day P/PO
0.00 0.00 0.173
0.00 0.00 0.091
0.03 0.00 0.048
0.28 0.01 0.025
0.50 0.02 0.021
0.83 0.03 0.018
1.00 0.04 0.017
3.00 0.13 0.013
6.00 0.25 0.011
9.00 0.38 0.009
12.00 0.50 0.009
15.00 0.63 0.008
18.00 0.75 0.008
24.00 1.00 0.007
The equation has been reduced to a logarithmic equation' which has been optimized with
respect to the two main parameters "a" and "b" following the historical SPX dataset. The
obtained parameter estimates are reported in table above, while equation 7 reports the formula
with the resulting values. Time is given in seconds:
Qin (%) = 0.173. t
-028
Eq. 7
The reactor operation time is assumed to be infinite and the decay heat is mainly that due to the fission products.
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Table 3: Confidence intervals on the parameter estimation of the ANS Curve for the Super Phoenix Reactor.
Lower 95% Upper 95%
"a" parameter =0.173
confidence interval 0.180 0.166
variation from predicted -0.038 0.040
variation from predicted [%] -3.85% 4.00%
"b" parameter =0.28
confidence interval 0.276 0.285
variation from predicted 0.017 -0.016
variation from predicted [%] 1.65% -1.60%
Figure 3: Results from the optimization on the dataset of the Super Phoenix reactor compared to a LWR.
Figure 3 shows the power rate curve obtained from the SPX dataset with the ANS
formula and compares it to the corresponding values obtained for a Light Water Reactor, LWR.
The two resulting curves are shifted as due to the different fuel composition. Note that this
calculation has been performed in order to reduce the uncertainties on the input parameters of the
model of the core and therefore avoid the decay heat parameters as possible sources of
uncertainty top include in the propagation analysis which will be defined in the next Chapter.
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Core Heat Capacity
The calculation for the specific heat at constant pressure is fundamental to determine the core
heat capacity which figures in Equation 1. The fast gas reactor in the current design at MIT has a
fuel which composes the core according to the table below.
Table 4: Tube-In-Duct (TID) Type Core (1 Ilringrev2)
Active Core (No Control Rods Inserted)
Volume Cp @T=1000 C DensityCore Material Fraction [KW/Kg C] [Kg/m3]
TRU 0.4661 0.335 10960
BeO 0.1239 1.02 1733
ODS Ma 956
(Cladding/Support - 0.137 0.45 7860
Steel)
S-C02 Coolant 0.273 -
By means of the values reported in the table and by defining the two coefficients x and y,
the specific heat of the core, on a heavy metal bases, can be given as:
270 _yi _ z __ KS= . C + c + c = 0.536 KJ
238 [ ) px PX kgcore C Eq. 8
where:
x= volume fraction UO2
y= volume fraction BeO
z=volume fraction of steel (Fe)
1-(x+y+z) = coolant (CO 2)
Then, by taking into account the different uncertainties, based on expert judgments, the value
of cp averaged over the core is:
Up = 0.38-0.56 [KJ/kgwore -C] Eq. 9
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Core Hot Spot and Core Average Specific Power
The specific power, for the GFR core is within the range of values reported below:
QO = 18-25 KW/kgcore Eq. 10
On the basis of the most recent Tube-In-Duct (TID) type core (11 RINGREV2), the core
average specific power to be equal to 20.7412 KW/Kg-core [C.S. Handwerk at al, 2007].
The core is modeled as a single averaged channel. In order to simulate the hot channel a
peaking factor has been introduced. In order to protect the core hot spot we introduce a total
peaking factor equal to:
F = Fr Fz = 1.15 1.3 = 1.495 Eq. 11
This is in turn, determines the maximum temperature of the fuel that allows us to monitor
the overall averaged temperature of the cladding and structures within the core.
By putting together all the equations from I to 9 and by means of the values provided in
the previous sections, it is obtained the model of the core which has been used to run the
simulations on which is based the first application of the methodology provided in the next
chapter. The only parameter which due to its importance deserves further explainations is given
by the overall heat transfer coefficient. With its description concludes this brief section dedicated
to illustrate the fundamental features of the core's model which has been used in this work.
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1.2.1.1 Calculation of Temperatures in Cladding and Fuel for a
Lumped Core
In this Section, the methodology used to calculate the overall thermal resistance over a
lumped core is described. The methodology and assumptions used in calculating the temperature
rise across the various materials which constitute the single core channel were adopted from a
FORTRAN code called FLOWSPLIT, while the lumping of the core into a unique fuel element
was elaborated by following classical geometrical considerations. The FLOWSPLIT code was
written by Pavel Hejzlar at MIT in order to provide convenient inputs to the RELAP code. We
here limit the discussion to report the set of equations and their relative core parameters. The
overall heat transfer coefficient, Uco_,, used to relate the average temperature of the core to the
average temperature of the coolant, as shown in Eq. 3, as taken from this code. Further
explanations of the methodology can be found in [M. Pope, 2006] which describes in detail the
phenomena and the variables involved in the diagram of a unit TID cell.
Figure 4: Schematization and fundamental geometrical parameters for the core channel.
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Overall Heat Transfer Coefficient
The overall heat transfer coefficient, Uo-g, or inverse of the thermal resistance, relates
the linear power of an annular fuel element to the temperature drop T.o - Tg,co by considering the
series of thermal resistances posed by the fuel, the gap, the cladding and the cooling gas. The
coefficient reported below has been calculated assuming a thick clad, neglecting the irradiation
term in the gap and assuming the thermal conductivity of the solid annular fuel pellet to be equal
to its average value in the temperature range of interest. Also gap size and effect of initial heatup
are not considered. The impact of the approximation introduced by these hypotheses is not
essential for the purposes of the present work because they do not substantially modify the
behavior of the main T-H variables but add uncertainties in the model or parameters which
should be taken account of in the successive reliability quantifications.
K, 1 In(R1 / Roo ITK - Tg,co = P Uc o - + - / + - Eq. 12
co- o 2;TkL, 2R,gph,L,o, 2fk(L,o, ho-0 gSo,
The methodology followed in order to obtain the four thermal conductivity terms in the
above equations are summarized by several considerations. These are explained in the next four
sections.
Thermal Conductivity in the Fuel
Determination of fuel temperatures is important in order to ensure that no melting
occurs during normal operation and to predict fission gas release. An estimate of the thermal
conductivity of the fuel must be made in order to determine these temperatures. Usually, for
conventional fuels, a great amount of data is available pertaining to the thermal conductivity. In
case of the GFR design, however, the specified fuel geometry and composition has not been
irradiated in a prototypical experiment and thus some approximations have made [M. Pope,
2006] in order to estimate temperatures during operation.
In estimating the thermal conductivity of the BeO/(U,TRU)02 fuel, the thermal
conductivity of stoichiometric (oxygen/metal atom ratio = 2.00) mixed oxide fuel (MOX) of
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20% plutonium and 80% uranium at 95% theoretical density is used as a starting point. Two
factors are used to modify this conductivity; one to account for the presence of BeO, and one
to account for the change of the conductivity resulting from burnup by means of the
major assumption of the separability of these two effects. Further details are once again
provided by [M. Pope, 2006] from which we report the fundamental results for the resulting
Kf shown in Figure 5.
K =1.5- F +6.9 10-"Tf b. 0.042+2.71-10-4 Tco O Eq. 13
where k is thermal conductivity in W/m-K and Tco is the temperature of the lumped core
in 'K. The factor of 1.5 accounts for the 50% increase in conductivity from the presence of the
BeO diluent, and the burnup degradation factor Fb, is evaluated at 120 MWd/kg by means of a
polynomial expression which is a function of the temperature.
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Figure 5: Estimated thermal conductivity of BeO/(U,TRU)02 fuel. Source of the figure: M. Pope, 2006 page 59 [1].
The Ka factor arises from the solution to the one-dimensional Fourier's heat transfer equation
for an annulus of fuel, and introduces a geometrical dependence which is at the basis of the
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adopted geometry because it benefits the thermal conductance within the element:
K [I(1- (RI /Rea)2) In(Rea / R.I) Eq. 14
K-[ 4 2
Thermal Conductivity in the Cladding
Since the cladding wall thickness is relatively small compared to its diameter and the
temperature change across the cladding is small relative to the total temperature difference
between coolant and peak fuel, heat transfer through the cladding can be treated with
reasonable accuracy as one-dimensional heat transfer through a constant-conductivity
medium. This temperature rise across the cladding is estimated for a lumped fuel element by the
third term of Equation 3. The material chosen for the cladding is ODS MA956 [Special metals,
2004].
Thermal conductivity across the Fuel-Clad Gap
The hgap contained in the second term of Equation 3 is the conductance at the fuel-clad
interface which is approximately given by hgp =kgas tgap where kgas is the thermal
conductivity of the gas filling the gap that here is assumed to be CO 2 at constant pressure and, tgap
is the fuel-clad gap thickness. The approximation introduced by the formula is due to the neglect
of a second term, not shown here, accounting for radiation. Previous studies [ M. Pope, 2006]
showed that for values of the parameters kgas = 0.08 W/mK and tgap = 70 gim, the gap
conductance resulting from conduction alone has a value of 1000 W/m 2Ka and thus, the
conduction term tends to be larger than the radiation term, and total gap conductance values in
the range from 1000 to 1500 W/m 2K can be expected.
241Page
Geometrical Lumping Parameters
The basic relationship existing between the linear power and the total thermal power
explains the presence of Ltot in the first three terms of Eq. 3, which groups the fuel heights of the
active channels in a unique parameter given by Lo,o = nch, Hc,. The fourth term of the equation
make use of Stot which is the total surface of the channels in contact with the coolant, it is given
by So, = nch (rRc, 2) . The linear and the volumetric power are averaged over the axial dimension
and thus they represent the average of the co-sinusoidal flux distribution in this direction. Finally
note that formally these simplifications are valid in a steady state regime, and constitute a valid
approximation in the quasi-steady state transient analyzed in this work.
q'Lo, =q"- .'Rea2Lto, - Po Eq. 15
In the table below we report the main geometrical values and the core parameters
described in this Section. Note that the values are consistent with previous RELAP calculations
and with the geometrical parameters of the selected design in this work.
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Table 5: Parameters and geometrical dimensions used for the GFRDYN Model
Design
Thermal power (MWth) 2,400
Axial power shape Chopped cosine
Axial peaking factor 1.3
Radial peaking factor 1.15
Channel Pitch 13.3
CLAD
Clad thickness (m) 0.7E-03
Clad thermal conductivity (W/m-K) 20
Inner Cladding Radius Rci (m) 3.5E-03
Outer Cladding Radius Rco (m) 4.2E-03
GAP
Average Radius Gap 4.200035E-03
Gap CO2 conductivity (W/m-K) 0.08
Hot gap thickness (m) 70E-06
FUEL
Fuel conductivity (W/m-K) 2.9 - 4.5; avg=3.7
Internal Radius Channel RFI 4.20007E-03
CORE
Channels in the core 100,170
External Equivalent Channel Radius Rea (m) 6.983E-03
Core's channel Active Length (m) 1.54
Heated Core Area = lumped core surface (m2) 3392
Active Core Volume(m3) 24
Lumped Core's Length= Active Length*Channels in the core(m) 154,261.8
Heat transfer coefficient channel gas interface (W/m 2 .K) 100
Channel surface roughness 1E-05
The values reported in the table for the different annuli constituting the single fuel
channel are calculated at hot conditions. Finally note that in the current model the value of the
average Kf(T) has been chosen, and that the heat transfer coefficient value as well as all the other
quantities composing the overall heat transfer coefficient were calculated, under steady state
conditions so they are subject to uncertainties which could be later addressed into reliability
calculations.
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1.2.2 The Decay Heat Removal System
By definition, passive system functionality does not rely on an external source of energy. The
advantage of such systems is that they are always available, yet they rely on energy sources
which are weak compared to those of the more traditional active systems [L. Pagani, 2007]. For
this reason, in the present work, a limited time window within the LOCA's evolution has been
selected during which the force generated by the system is at its lowest value. Incidentally, this
window corresponds to the quasi-steady state transient - period that goes from the time the
pressure within the different volumes of the plant reaches equilibrium, to the time the decay heat
goes below a pre-defined cutoff value. During this time frame - as the force decreases - the
exposure to uncertainties will be higher.
Furthermore, the reference time window assumed, allows excluding the uncertainties related
to the time of the intervention of the system and thus excluding from the modeling active pumps
and diesel generator system which are typically working in the first few minutes following the
scram [JC. Gamier et al.,2006].
In fact, the Decay Heat Removal Systems used to remove heat from the GFR plant are two
kinds: passive and active. Hybrid functioning of the two is also considered and details about this
can be found in [L. Pagani, 2007]. The two modes of operation are described below:
Active mode: In this mode, an electric motor, EM, obtains electricity from offsite or onsite
power sources, and rotates the blower, B. The hot coolant (coming from the core) flows through
a check-valve, CV, that it kept closed during full power operation (to prevent backflow from
station 3 to 2) and opens for emergency cooling. Then the coolant flows through the Heatric TM
Heat Exchanger (HCHX), where the heat is removed (see heat-sink).
Passive mode: The blower is supposed to be inoperable (failure of the blower or of the power
sources). Passive flow is induced by the temperature difference between the heat source (core)
and the cold source (HCHX, which is located higher than the core).
The analyses performed in the next sections refer to the passive system DHR or to the core
connected to it. As stated above, by mean of a selected time-window, the time in which the
active system intervenes is excluded from calculations.
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1.2.3 The Selected Time-Frame
Among the entire sequence of events characterizing a loss of coolant accident, two
particular timee are of major interest for our calculations:
* The time at which the equilibrium in pressure (on average) is reached within the whole
system composed by the core, the primary circuit and the containment building
* The time at which the heat produced by the fission products is reduced to 1 MWth and thus,
reduced to a cut-off value under which the heat absorption capability of the core is sufficient to
remove the heat from the system without producing any further and significant thermodynamic
change on the system.
These two major events concur in defining the time frame or, reference time window, we
used in our simulations. The reasons which underlying selection of this specific time frame are as
follows:
1. Passive systems could be described as systems acting due to weak forces. Among these
forces, gravity is the most often used to let the system automatically intervene without resorting
to any operator or externally induced force. The decay heat removal system of the GFR is
designed in such a way that a gravity induced force, the buoyancy head, drives the gas through a
cooling loop. The regime within the loop is dominated by natural convection characterized by a
mass flow rate which is lower when compared to the value that could be obtained by actively
pumping the gas. The objective of a rigorous safety analysis of the loop then must consider this
weak behavior of the system, and the locations and or time-frames in which weakest behaviors
can be more stressed. In case of a LOCA, the blow-down time is characterized by high pressures
and velocities, thus represented by strong forces imposed on the system over a limited time. The
time frame which experiences the weakest behavior is then after the blow-down peak, when the
passive DHR has already started removing heat and which has larger temporal horizons and the
weakest forces involved ( natural convection mechanism in the DHR and containment).
The time window selected initiates starts with reaching an overall equilibrium of the gas among
all the possible control volumes connected to the primary system, and ends with a definitive
completion of the heat removal from the gas.
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2. The phase in which the discharge of the gas into the containment is completely over (about
30 seconds) should be sufficient to discharge a gas with that mole fraction, starting from a 20
MPa pressure regardless of the size of the break considered, and taken into account any
uncertainty related to the dimensions of the volume into which it expands at the time when the
gas reaches its equilibrium pressure. This avoids including the critical mass flow rate within the
model with the benefit of not considering any uncertainty related to the break size, possible
changes of phase of the super-critical CO2, and some components such as active blowers and
valves (which is in general few milliseconds if operated automatically, and minutes if manually
started), which of course play a role in the initial instants of the accident or post- scram
sequence.
3. At the considered initial time (equal to 550 seconds as provided by the RELAP-3D 2 code) the
gas has already reached the so called back-up pressure, which is fundamental in supporting the
natural convection mechanism within the ECCS.
4. At this time, local phenomena such as possible stratification of the gas within the
containment, or, inhomogeneous local accumulations of the gas can be excluded.
5. Finally, the time at which we stop our simulations, is the time for the decay heat curve to
reach the cut-off value of 1 MWth.
6. In ultimis, by selecting a limited time frame, we save computational time.
2 J.Lee has run the code for a LOCA with this set of assumptions which, been used as initial conditions for the
model built in order to simulate the core dynamics, namely the GFRDYN_LUMPED Model [Lee, J.I., et al.,
2007].
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1.2.4 The Reference Scenario
The proposed simulation considers the dynamic evolution of the main thermo-dynamic
properties during a LOCA in a selected time-window. The simulation starts after that the blow-
down occurs and therefore when the gas is completely discharged from the primary system to the
containment building. The energy in the gas, in case of the Fast Gas Reactor under study at MIT
is the supercritical C02, is being removed by the designated auxiliary system based on natural
recirculation, the ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System).
Previous RELAP5-3D simulations show that the timing of the fuel release depends on the
size of the break on the primary coaxial duct of the GFR. For a 70,000 metric cubic feet
containment volume, with a 100 inch2 break on the coaxial duct, the full release completes at
around 550 seconds after the accident occurs.
This result is in accordance with calculations of the critical flow reached by the gas when
simulated as perfect and single phased. The achieved time value of 550 seconds has been set as
the initial time for simulations, and the details behind this choice were explained in the previous
Section. The final time for all simulations is set to be at 10,000 seconds, which is when the gas is
expected to reach steady - state conditions. In this interval of time, the gas discharged in the first
550 seconds is expected to gradually reach steady-state equilibrium among the different sub-
volumes containing it. The observed behavior is usually called quasi-static equilibrium and
mathematically expressed by introducing negligible inertia values in the equations of
conservation of moment applied along the circuit in which heat is removed from the core (the
passive recirculation system)
The figure below reports a classical sequence of the proposed accident in the range 550-
10,000 seconds, for the temperature of the core. The temperature of the core starts from an initial
value, T fuel 0, which is provided by previous RELAP5-3D simulations and thus equal to 600 K.
The observed peaking behavior for the reference case is due to both the initial value of the mass
flow rate, Gas Mass Flow Rate 0, and to the still high value of the decay heat rate. As time
passes the mass flow rate within the ECCS loop increases and the decay heat rate diminishes,
therefore increasing the rate of extraction of heat from the core, which in turn leads to the
progressive decrease of temperature shown by Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Reference case of the fuel temperature, as given by the GFRDYN_LUMPED Model.
In term of safety margins it can be observed that the temperature gradients within the
core (temperature of the cladding and temperature of the fuel) are respected and thus that their
nominal values (mean values or best estimated values as predicted from the code) are well below
the two lines of Figure 7 defining the failure criteria of the materials in use.
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Figure 7: Reference case simulations of the cladding and fuel margins. Blue line represents the temperature
transient while the red straight lines show the limits imposed by the materials.
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1.3 Modeling Techniques
In this section we present a brief overview of the main modeling techniques used to
perform the calculations. The reasons behind their choice are provided together with some of the
fundamental features. Specifically, the first section provides insights about the applicability of
the System Dynamics paradigm to technical problems. The second part gives an overview of the
supervised learning methods which are going to be used to interpret the data obtained from the
modeling phase, and provides basic elements of their applicability.
1.3.1 Systems Dynamics Modeling
System Dynamics to Model Transients in T-H Plants
System dynamics is a methodology for studying and managing complex feedback
systems, such as one finds in business and other social systems. In fact it has been used to
address practically every sort of feedback system.
The system and the accident sequence considered are described dynamically by means of
Causal-Loop Diagrams and then Stock-Flow Diagrams taking into account all important
relations and variables which describe the behavior of the system. This modeling approach,
traditionally known under the name of System Dynamics, has been considered suitable to model
T-H systems because of the motivations that follow:
Lumped Modeling versus Traditional T-H Codes
The choice of a lumped parameter model favors the intuitive understanding of
uncertainties propagation, it is easy to implement, provide results that are within the range of
validity of traditional codes. Although Systems Dynamics modeling yields a level of accuracy
inferior to that of traditional RELAP codes, it is used because it constructively enables us to
32 Pa ge
catch non-linear feedbacks between the activity occurring in the core and the phenomena taking
place in other regions of the plant.
Passive systems in general and especially passive systems based on natural recirculation,
are exposed to great changes in their state as due to the variation of initial and boundary
conditions. This particularly high sensitivity to the initial condition of the system is
conventionally well known and captured by system dynamic models. SD representation reveals
particularly appealing in managing the propagation of uncertainties affecting the value of the
parameters at initial times.
Respect of SD Software Capabilities during the Selected Simulation Time-Frame
A pre-defined time window has been chosen as a privileged interval to check the
capabilities of the passive recirculation system under the weakest operating condition.
Incidentally, this window corresponds to the quasi-steady state transient period that goes from
the time the pressure within the different volumes of the plant reaches equilibrium, to the time
the decay heat goes below a pre-defined cutoff value. The reasons beyond the choice of the
specified time interval are mainly of physical nature and intimately related to the definition of
the safety margins defined for the passive system. So despite the choice to analyze the selected
time interval has no foundation in the SD field, the use of SD to define a quasi-steady state
transient reveals to be appropriate and actually less computationally expensive than traditional T-
H codes.
Improvements in the Computational Capability to Explore Transients
The desired accuracy provided by the SD code is preserved and actually allows analyzing
in detail - more simulations for each fundamental parameter variation - the scenarios of interest.
RELAP5 simulation of analogous system [F. MacKay,2007] produced 128 runs in about 12
hours considering the variation of six fundamental parameters at a time. Most of the time was
attributable to the higher plant's representation but the response was not always statistically
representative of the sample analyzed.
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Other General Reasons
System Dynamics as it is known today is not practiced in physics very much. It is used in
social sciences, management applications and in general to analyze complex systems.
Although its use is not very diffused to analyze T-H systems, system dynamics tools have
been used for modeling dynamical physical processes before: an in-depth study of the dynamical
structure of thermal processes, including a discussion of the unified view of physical processes,
can be found in [H.U. Fuchs, 2001].
In the specific case of the lumped model provided here basic constitutive equations were
used and the whole system can be built by means of mass, and momentum conservation and
energy. Energy has three fundamental properties, apart from the fact that it is conserved: it can
be stored, it can flow, and it can be released (or bound). In other words, if the rate at which
energy is released in one process can be calculated, we can equate it to the rate at which energy
is bound in the follow up process. The energy principle and energy properties can be easily used
to relate different processes to one another and thus to show the different interconnection
between different parts of the plant.
All the presented features made possible the use of System Dynamics model as a valid
model to represent the GFR plant. A visual layout of the plant in form of a Vensim Sketch is
provided in the Figure below.
Figure 8: Sketch illustrates the main variables and parameters modeled by the GFRDYN Model.
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1.3.2 Supervised Learning Modeling
Supervised learning is a machine learning technique for creating a function from training
data. The training data consist of pairs of input objects, and desired outputs. The output of the
function can be a continuous value, or can predict a class label of the input object. The task of
the supervised learner is to predict the value of the function for any valid input object after
having seen a number of training examples. To achieve this, the learner has to generalize from
the presented data to unseen situations in a "reasonable" way.
Supervised learning can generate models of two types. Most commonly, supervised
learning generates a global model that maps input objects to desired outputs. In some cases,
however, the map is implemented as a set of local models (such as in case-based reasoning or the
nearest neighbor algorithm use in cluster analyses).
In order to solve a given problem of supervised learning one has to consider various
steps:
* Determine the type of training examples. Before doing anything else, the engineer should
decide what kind of data is to be used as an example. For instance, this might be a single
handwritten character, an entire handwritten word, or an entire line of handwriting.
* Gathering a training set. The training set needs to be characteristic of the real-world use of
the function. Thus, a set of input objects is gathered and corresponding outputs are also gathered,
either from human experts or from measurements.
* Determine the input feature representation of the learned function. The accuracy of the
learned function depends strongly on how the input object is represented. Typically, the input
object is transformed into a feature vector, which contains a number of features that are
descriptive of the object. The number of features should not be too large, because of the curse of
dimensionality; but should be large enough to accurately predict the output.
* Determine the structure of the learned function and corresponding learning algorithm. For
example, the engineer may choose to use artificial neural networks or decision trees.
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* Complete the design. The engineer then runs the learning algorithm on the gathered training
set. Parameters of the learning algorithm may be adjusted by optimizing performance on a subset
(the so called validation set) of the training set, or via cross-validation. After parameter
adjustment and learning, the performance of the algorithm may be measured on a test set that is
separate from the training set.
Another term for supervised learning is classification. A wide range of classifiers are
available, each with its strengths and weaknesses. Classifier performance depends greatly on the
characteristics of the data to be classified. There is no single classifier that works best on all
given problems. Various empirical tests have been performed to compare classifier performance
and to find the characteristics of data that determine classifier performance. Determining a
suitable classifier for a given problem is not always an easy operation. For this work, two very
widespread techniques have been selected, the Logistic Regression classifier and the
Classification Tree. Both these techniques are linear with regard of the fundamental parameters
concurring to form the desired output. Despite that, their use has been widely extended to non-
linear models [Marquez et al., 2005]. The two methodologies in detail are explained in Section 2
and along with the examples of Section 3.
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2. THE METHODOLOGY
2.1 About Passive Systems
The issue of a correct analytic approach to Passive System' Reliability (PSR), is a
recurring one in the design of future generation power plants. One of the principal goals of the
new- generation nuclear power plants is, in fact, to address safety in a more efficient and
consistent manner. A convenient way to pursue this goal is by either adding, coupling or
substituting the traditional active systems with systems that are able to react spontaneously, like
those based on 'natural' mechanisms. These systems, which are termed Passive, are originally
conceived as capable of automatic intervention while being disconnected from all auxiliary
sources of energy and they are more specifically designed to be independent from common
causes of failure - first among all, human error. Their efficacy though, is yet to be proven, since
at the present time, they are still the object of an ongoing debate concerning their possible
introduction in nuclear power plants. Among the concerns raised by this debate are the
difficulties that would arise during the necessary phases of their testing and repairing, their
necessary dependence to contiguous parts of the plant, and the complexities associated with their
inclusion in standard PRAs.
This part of the work aims to investigate in detail the motivations behind the latter of these
concerns - the inclusion of passive systems in standard PRAs. The methodology that was used in
order to achieve this will be explained in this section following a brief account of the issues that
emerge during the analysis performed to assess the reliability of Passive Systems.
The development of any proper methodology, aimed at assessing the reliability of a Passive
System, is characterized by the following four fundamental steps:
I. Identification and quantification of the sources of uncertainties;
II. Propagation of the uncertainties through a T-H model;
III. Evaluation of the T-H system reliability;
IV. Inclusion of the T-H reliability in the accident sequence.
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These milestones are specially indicated for those passive systems characterized by a working
and moving fluid (termed Thermo-Hydraulic, T-H). This work focuses mainly on the first 3 steps
of the checklist. The first milestone, relating to the identification and quantification of the
sources of uncertainties, follows this introduction. The next point, which relates to the
propagation of such uncertainties throughout a T-H model, will be argued later on in this section,
as part of the introduction to the techniques and tools, in order to better explain the algorithm
used to simulate this behavior. The third step, concerning the evaluation of a T-H system in light
of the previous analyses, will be expounded throughout the formal discussion of the method.
T-H systems are of great importance and fall under the IAEA Categories B and C. Generally
their specific mission is associated with a cooling function and in most of the cases their
behavior is difficult to predict, especially if solicited by external or internal perturbations. This
last aspect is of fundamental importance, because these systems usually rely solely on forces
such as gravity, which by nature are weak. This implies that, as opposed to traditional active
turbo-machineries, in order to accomplish the same task - for instance that of removing the decay
heat- a passive system usually takes longer and it requires specific environmental conditions to
operate. As a result, the conventional uncertainties which any T-H model is exposed to, combine
with those arising from the use of this particular type of system. This aspect makes Passive
Systems particularly vulnerable to those perturbations which are hardest to predict, and most
likely to occur, in the event of an accident. This possible vulnerability to external factors was
taken into account by concentrating, during the analysis of the accidental scenario, on studying
the specific time of the transient under which the convection mechanism is less stable (since it's
just across different T-H regimes). Example I of Section 3 analyses a component of the passive
system and subjected to a thermal shock.
These and other fundamental aspects of PSR would be clarified later in this work. The
design of a methodology to help conduct the analyses of milestones I, II and III will be the next
objective within this discussion. Finally the tools used to solve the problem with the new
approach, will be given at the end of this Section.
Though the focus of this study remains on the relevant parameters - taken as input to the
models used to characterize the plant, or portions thereof, during the selected scenario - it is
nonetheless important to know the whole gamma of uncertainties that could affect the operation
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of the passive system. Following is a list of most of the sources of uncertainties characterizing
such systems:
* Initial and boundary conditions. This is particularly observable in Example I of this work: it
focuses on a specific time-frame of the accident by neglecting the initial discharge of the gas
within the containment, and thus the initial conditions remain uncertain (even if provided by
separate analyses). Another typical example of this kind of uncertainty is the initial time setting,
meaning the selection of the moment during which the system begins to intervene.
* Phenomenological uncertainties, as due to the possible unknown phenomena occurring in the
working fluid. Typically these are consequence of approximations made in modeling the
physical processes such as correlations or phenomena like the stratification of the gas. This
aspect is very crucial because as explained in the previous chapter, it is cause for deviations from
the expected normal operational state of the system.
* Parametrical uncertainties, due to the lack of data, as is the case for innovative technologies
such as the GFR. Approximations in the system's geometry often take place. An apparent
example of this is the chosen height at which the Heat Exchanger of the ECCS is placed.
* Uncertainties deriving from modeling aspects which are unknown because still untested and
unobserved. This is the case of the passive systems for which only few prototypes are available,
and thus little to no data from experiments exist.
* Uncertainties which are a consequence of an inaccurate determination of failure/success
criteria. An example of this could be the choice of an epistemic failure limit for the temperature
of the cladding, as it is for the material used in the GFR, which are not tested yet under real
operating conditions (radiation, high temperature, and so on). In this work, the consequences of
multiple failure modes, or failure criteria, are highlighted in Example III.
* Internal uncertainties improperly evaluated by the T-H codes. This aspect is not stressed
through this work, but it is important for a comprehensive assessment of the accuracy provided
by the adopted codes with regards to the overall accuracy in gauging the above mentioned
sources of uncertainty.
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2.2. Available Resources
The PSR debate is major, thus it is important to define a methodology because of the
pressing need to include such systems in the next generation of nuclear power plants. In view of
this, there have been a number of diverse approaches to fulfill this task. Most of them, given that
they refer to T-H applications, follow the milestones mentioned in the previous chapter. There is
no evidence as of yet of a commitment to a specific technique for the identification of the
fundamental parameters, yet there is a collective agreement that such techniques should not be
based on a single method but instead on the comparison of multiple ones [J.P.C. Kleijnen, J.C.
Helton, 1999; Marques et al., 2005]. A good portion of the relevant available literature
[Zio et al., 2003; Marques et al., 2005] justifies the need for a method. Most of these
efforts recommend solving this problem by adopting the Analytical Hierarchy Process,
AHP, proposed to help identify the important driving parameters then rank them by
building a hierarchy based on pairwise comparisons [Saaty, 1980]. However, the
effectiveness of this method is limited by its qualitative nature, together with the sheer
manpower needed to carry it out (it requires to have multiple analysts' meticulous
judgments).
An equally important matter centers on clarifying the need, or lack thereof, of
iteration loops between the tasks required to evaluate the PSR. A number of studies
support the use of iteration loops [Ricotti. et al., 2002; Marques et al., 2005], while other
more recent works maintain that the focus should be on simplifying the conceptual
development of a method, thus sparing iterative processes and further initial sensitivity
analyses [J. Mackay et al., 2007]. These and other issues will be dealt with later on in this
document, while discussing the development of the methodology proposed here.
Additional sources that have been researched for the purposes of the present work are
efforts that do not specifically refer to safety systems application [Wilson et al., 1998], or even
to nuclear power plants [J.C. Helton et al., 2006], yet they were taken into consideration for
their approach to specific obstacles common to PSR.
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2.3 Possible Applications and Main Objectives
The method proposed here, aims to improve the existing PSR methodologies specifically
by including a quantitative evaluation of the fundamental parameters. Given the nature of the
problem, this is in truth a multi-objective task, thus, it was elaborated by following the goals
listed below. Further evidence of their impact will be given in the examples discussed by the
next Section.
A. Distinguish among the available parameters those that significantly contribute to the failure
of the single-systems composing the nuclear power plant. The measure selected as acceptance
criterion for the parameters is the statistical significance;
B. Define a hierarchy of the parameters concurring to the failure of the system. The parameters
can be ranked with respect to their ability to lead the system to failure, following a classification
based, again, on their statistical significance;
C. Prioritize the sub-systems composing the plant, on the basis of the contribution given by the
single parameters which lead the system to failure;
D. Provide possible combinations/clusters/parameter sets which can lead the plant to anomalous
behaviors (failure or semi- failure), thus enabling engineers to avoid certain configurations
(combination of parameters);
E. Interpret the statistical significance of the results obtained from the code;
F. Predict the behavior of the plant, and thus reduce the computational time which is required to
run further sensitivity tests;
Note that this type of methodology can be applied to steady state problems as well as to
dynamic ones. This study focuses on the latter type of systems so those undergoing transient
conditions and quasi-static states. The benefit of this type of analysis is that it makes it possible
to detect failures of the systems instantaneously and simultaneously (time dependence failure
progression can also be taken into account). Note that, the need of an application of a method for
PSR to transient problems, was pointed out by previous analyses [Pagani et al., 2005]; its
relevance to steady state problem is discussed with Example III in Section 3.
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Some of the main advantages in providing a methodology as that described in the next
chapter are the following:
* Pre-design risk-informed: test different design strategies at their initial stage. i.e.
Containment volume can be used as a proxy for the different pressures and the probability of
failure can be measured for different values of the system or containment pressure;
* Regulatory aspects: establish design sequences and iterative risk-informed evaluations of the
plant;
* Optimizations check: reliability versus economical feasibility, actual state of technology and
flexibility of design.
These three driving benefits, among the many possible, were selected because of their
relation to risk-informed procedures. The latter are also part of the ongoing debate about PSR.
Their inclusion could be part of future developments of this study and it is discussed in the last
Section of this document. The next chapter will venture into the formal description of the method
proposed in this document, clarifications on the statistical tools, sample techniques and software
used in this effort, will also be provided later on.
2.4 The Methodology
In traditional Thermal-Hydraulic (T-H) codes, the computational time required to have a
satisfactory number of runs is usually high. In addition, the high number of parameters involved
in the sensitivity analyses calls for a ranking of their importance based on their relative
contribution to the system failure. Therefore, a method based on data interpretation techniques is
thus proposed in order to provide guidance in the inclusion of passive systems in PSA.
The following diagram provides a possible roadmap for the determination of the PSR.
The single steps of the methodology are described below by highlighting the contribution given
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by the appliance of statistical techniques in order to address some of the fundamental steps
associated with that.
4 5 6
Figure 9: Roadmap for the evaluation of parameters in a PSR contest.
Each step of the technique has been validated and tested through the results obtained in
the course of three different examples illustrated in the next Section. Note that the
comprehensive analysis presented here has been first elaborated at MIT 3 and then tested in a
preliminary manner via the present work.
The conceptual development of the methodology is here presented following the tasks
shown in Figure 9. Note that the check-list is expanded to catch more aspects than in the above
3 The methodology proposed in this work has been implemented at the 15.077/ESD.753 - Statistical Learning &
Data Mining - class held by Prof. R. Welsch whose contributions to this work are much appreciated.
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sketch, and therefore does not exactly match with the diagrams in the figure which have been
kept compact in order to maintain its original illustrative purpose.
1. Build the model of the plant;
2. Build the model of the accident;
3. Choose an initial set of parameters and attribute them a distribution (PDF);
4. Define the failure criteria for the plant;
5. Determine the functional failure states of the plant;
6. Determine the overall failure of the plant;
7. Determine the relevant parameters concurring to the single failure of the plant;
7a. Run a sensitivity analysis as a function of the initial pre-defined set of parameters;
7b. Use the predicted realizations as dependent variables of a logistic regression;
7c. Exclude from the dataset those parameters which are not statistically significant in
leading the system to failure (p-statistic above 0.05) and rank the remaining ones;
7d. Verify that the new overall failure of the system does not change when the non-
influential parameters are removed. If it change an interaction analysis is required;
8. Interpret Failures through the pair-wise comparison of the statistically significant parameters
through the scope of the scatterplots;
8a. Use a classification tree to determine the value of the parameters which lead the plant to
failure and cross validate the importance of the branch of the tree with the values of the
p-statistic originated by the logistic model;
9. Go back to point I and re-design the system in light of the new information provided by the
classifiers.
Asides from the nine points through this table, it is important, for the sake of completion,
to add two more remarks to those already made. The first is that the core of the present analysis
is given in step 7 where it is pointed out the way the effective Parameters Evaluation for Passive
System's Reliability, PEPSR. The second is an amendment to step 7d: there should be some
interaction among the fundamental parameters used as a input for the model, when that occurs,
removing the parameters with high p-values could lead to significant changes in the measured
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Failure Probability, PF and in the re-obtained -values of the parameters concurring to it. Explicit
techniques may be used, if such limitations are known a priori from the analyst that the states of
knowledge of the parameters are dependent: the adoption of multivariate distributions or
conditional probability distributions would 'remove' the presence of common contributors to the
uncertainty of the parameters. Instances of such limitations need to be identified and addressed
by showing them in specific simulations which are not given in the present work.
A final observation is about the overall methodology compared to similar milestones: the
method developed is recursive in the determination of the fundamental parameters participating
to the final output PF and avoid the use of preliminary or parallel sensitivity analyses in addition
to the fundamental analysis depicted in Figure 10.
Further aspects of the developed methodology are differed to the practical application
offered by the exercises contained in Section 3.
2.5 Tools and Computational Methods
In order to address to test the methodology illustrated in the previous chapters, a
combination of techniques has been chosen. The interconnection existing between the different
modules which compute the nine steps of the milestones' list is depicted in Figure 10.The
diagram presented in the figure can be divided into three main computational zones:
I. Input Analysis and LHS sampling;
II. Model of the world processing and output;
III. Data mining analysis and interpretation of the results;
The three zones, as shown in the figure, represent different processes in cascade: first we
select the input, define their distributions, then we process them into the selected model of the
world (GFRDYN_LUMPED Model or RELAP5-3D code), then, the obtained output (probability
of failure) is processed along with the dataset created by LHS in a unique table that the
classification models (logistic regression and classification tree) read to train and validate before
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providing their responses. Last step is the reciprocal comparison between LR and CT via
agreement tables and lift charts. A brief presentation of the tools is given in the next sections.
Figure 10: Visual of the scheme used to create the dataset which is used as input for the supervising models.
2.5.1 Classification Techniques
In order to address the objectives specified in the previous chapters, a combination of two
popular prediction techniques, the classification tree and the logistic regression, was adopted.
This choice is motivated chiefly by the simplicity in the application of the two methods, and to a
lesser extent because of the effortlessness in the understanding of their results.
Note that the adoption of the two techniques in parallel guarantees an extra check on the
accuracy of the obtained results [J.P.C. Kleijnen ET AL., 1999]. Furthermore, the cross
validation between the two techniques, increases the confidence in the overall method and
provides higher robustness and credibility to each of the two techniques.
Lastly, classification techniques allow for the verification of the basic assumptions made
on the parameters we input in the sensitivity analyses i.e. their independence.
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The next section provides details of these two techniques by specifying their comparative
features and by illustrating them in a first example.
The use of classification models to compute predictions for a discrete or categorical dependent
variable is widespread and well recognized. Examples of dependent variables in this type of model
are binary variables. In these, as the name implies, there are exactly two levels - or possible states -
this makes them particularly suitable to model the failure state of a plant. The variables in the model
that determine the predictions are called the independent variables, which, if the goal is to describe
the plant's reliability, represent the possible contributors to the final failure states.
Classification Trees
Classification trees, CT, are tree-based models that provide a simple yet powerful way
to predict a categorical response based on a collection of predictor variables. The data are
recursively partitioned into two groups based on predictor (independent) variables. This is
repeated until the response (dependent) variable is homogenous. The sequence of splits of
the predictor variables can be displayed as a binary tree, hence the name.
A classification tree can be described as a series of rules. For a response y and given a set
of predictors xl, x2,.., x, a classification tree rule would be of the form:
If xj < 23 andx2 E (A, E} then y is most likely category 2
The simplicity of the model display and prediction rules makes classification trees an
attractive data mining tool. Other advantages of tree models include:
* Invariance to monotone re-expression of the predictor variables;
* Can easily capture nonlinear behavior in a predictor as well as interactions among predictors;
* Unlike logistic regression, can model categorical response variables with more than two
levels.
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Logistic Regression Classifiers
The logistic regression, LR, allows for the modeling of the probability of a binary event
occurring as a linear function of a set of independent variables. Logistic regression models are a
special type of linear model in which the dependent variable is categorical and has exactly two
levels or possible outcomes; because of this they are particularly suitable for predicting the
probability of failure.
A linear model provides a way of estimating a dependent variable, conditional on a linear
function of a set of independent variables, Xl, X2...X. In classical notation this can be expressed
as:
P
Y=0 +  X,+Ec. Eq. 16
i=l
In this equation, the Pi terms are the coefficients of the linear model; the intercept of the
model is Po and c is the residual. Estimates of the coefficients, ,, are computed from the
training data from which an estimate of the dependent variable, Y is calculated by substituting
the estimated coefficients in Eq. 16. An estimate of the residual, 6, is obtained by computing the
difference between the observed dependent variable and its estimate.
As mentioned earlier, in a logistic regression model the dependent variable is binary, and
each of the two class levels are coded as either a 0 or 1. The estimated dependent variable, Y, is
a guess of the probability of the level coded as a 1. The logistic regression model uses the
logistic function to express Y as a linear function of the set of independent variables. In its
classical notation the equation reads as:
g(Y)= log Yj = lo +  aflX + . Eq. 17
1-Y
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2.5.2 Latin Hypercube for Sensitivity Analyses
Sensitivity analysis is widely recognized as a fundamental component of studies based on
mathematical modeling and because of that is used to accomplish uncertainty analyses for PRA
and specifically to this work for PSR evaluations. Although sensitivity analysis is intimately tied
to uncertainty analysis, it has a tendency to be a more complex undertaking due to both the
variety of possible measures of sensitivity and the additional computational procedures required
to evaluate these measures. LHS is recognized to be a suitable technique to improve the
computational time of simulators and it constitutes part of the Monte Carlo procedure used for
the propagation of uncertainty. Monte Carlo is not the only option for this, in fact there exist a
number of other procedures that are also conventionally utilized for the propagation of
uncertainty, such as differential analysis, response surface methodology, RSM, the Fourier
amplitude sensitivity test ,FAST, and the closely related Sobol variance decomposition, and fast
probability integration ,FPI.
Amongst all, the Monte Carlo technique constitutes the most widely used approach to
sensitivity analysis in PRA studies, and it was adopted for this work because of its conceptual
simplicity.
When viewed in a form of a vector, a Monte Carlo sensitivity study involves a vector of
uncertain model inputs:
x = [x
,
,..., x2 , ] Eq. 18
where each xi is an uncertain input and ni is the number of such inputs, and a vector of model
predictions:
y = f(x) = [y, Y2,..., Y],' Eq. 19
where f is a function used to represent the model under consideration, each yi is an outcome of
evaluating the model with the input x, and no is the number of the possible outcomes, which for
our purposes will be equal to the number of systems which could lead the plant to failure.
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To carry out uncertainty and sensitivity analyses, the uncertainty in the elements of x
must be characterized. For this work, the uncertainty in the elements of x has been shown it is
assumed to be characterized by a sequence of input distributions
ID i = 1, 2,..., n, Eq. 20
which are used to characterize the uncertainty in each input xi, where IDi, is the distribution
assigned to xi. these distributions, as already mentioned in this Section, are most of the time
developed through an expert review process.
The LHS procedure is used to extract a sample:
xk =[Xlk, 2k ,...,Xnl,k] k= 1,2,...,M Eq. 21
from the population of x's with the distributions in Eq. 19, where M is the size of the sample.
Evaluation of the model under consideration with the sample elements xk in Eq. 21 then creates a
sequence of outputs of this type
Yk =f(Xk)=[YlkY 2k,'"Yno,,k] k = 1,2,...,M Eq. 22
where each yjk is a particular outcome of evaluating the model with xk . The pairs
(Xk, ,k) k= 1,2,...,M, Eq. 23
constitute a mapping from model input xk to model output Yk that can be explored with various
sensitivity analysis techniques to determine how the individual analysis inputs contained in x
(i.e., the different fundamental parameters involved in the analysis) affect the individual analysis
outcomes contained in y (i.e., the single systems' failure probabilities). In this work these
analyses are the logistic regression, the classification trees, and examination of scatterplots.
Although techniques based on regression analysis and correlation analysis are often
successful in identifying the relationships between model input and output embedded in the
mapping in Eq.23, it must be pointed out that they may fail to identify well-defined, but
nonlinear, relationships. In these cases, other sensitivity analysis techniques would be needed to
identify the desired patterns in the mapping of Eq. 23. These other techniques are not discussed
here but their inclusion in the present methodology could actually be the objective of further
developments of this work.
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2.5.3 Statistical Indicators
This study has attempted to maintain a statistical approach throughout the whole
methodology. A natural objection to this type of analysis, of using the same method during the
entire process, is that the observations deriving from its applicability could be flawed or partial.
In reality, the method retains its fairness thanks to the inclusion of different statistical techniques,
which are in turn based on various tests or algorithms; combined, these features assure that
results be verified through cross-validation. This is accomplished by means of two statistical
validation techniques applied in LR mode to classifier outputs: p-value and Wald value.
Following is a brief description of their main functions.
P-value
The p-value test, on the other hand, is handy for its ability to evaluate the probability of a
certain event, or of an extreme set of values. In classical statistics, it is used to calculate the
probability of the null hypothesis being true. Generally, one rejects the null hypothesis if the p-
value is smaller than or equal to the significance level, often represented by the Greek letter a
(alpha). If the level is 0.05, then the results are only 5% likely to be as extraordinary as just seen,
given that the null hypothesis is true.
Wald Statistics
In order to test the relevance of the results, statistic techniques such as the Wald and p-
value tests, where employed. The likelihood ratio test can also be used to test whether an effect
exists or not. Usually the Wald test and the likelihood ratio test give very similar conclusions (as
they are asymptotically equivalent), but very rarely, they disagree enough to lead to different
conclusions: this is because the statistical significance is always somewhat arbitrary, as it
depends on an arbitrarily chosen significance level. The other reason is that the Wald test uses
two approximations (that we know the standard error, and that the distribution is chi-squared),
whereas the likelihood ratio test uses one approximation (that the distribution is chi-squared) [F.
Harrell, 2001].
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2.5.4 The Software Used in the Simulations
Though the method is designed to be computationally easy, it was nonetheless necessary
to rely on software tools in order to carry out calculations and simulations.
All models of the world were developed with Vensim®, GoldSim® and RELAP5-3D ®.
The combined use of Vensim®, GoldSim®. for Examples I and III, was accomplished in order to
further validate their respective outputs. This was done in order to reduce uncertainties intrinsic
to the code.
As previously mentioned, LHS was used in order to select samples from the available
simulations. For the case of Example I, this operation was accomplished through the use of
Vensim® and GoldsSim® both of which have an LHS routine incorporated in their code.
Example II on the other hand, involved the use of a dataset provided by a specific T-H
code, RELAP5-3D® which is the latest in the RELAP® code series developed at the Idaho
National Laboratory (INL). This resulted in the necessity of using a subroutine in MatLab®
specifically designed [by F. Mackay, 2007] to create LHS dataset suitable for RELAP5-3D®.
The outputs thus generated by the above codes were statistically analyzed with the aid of
Insightful Miner®.
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2.5.5 Data Interpretation and Final Remarks
The interpretation of the results of the last module in Figure 10 is very intuitive. If the
model reaches an acceptable accuracy, between 80 and 100 percent, it means that the model's
responses can be trusted. This manner of determining the effectiveness of the overall method
reflects on the credibility of the indexes used to establish the importance of the single
parameters. The significance of each parameter when considered as an input is determined by its
p-value: those parameters identified by values below the threshold value of 0.05 are to be
considered important with regards to the final measured output, all others are to be excluded
from the ensuing analyses. The Wald Statistics' Test is then used as an additional validation for
these conclusions. The next step is to rank the parameters on the basis of the absolute values
given by the p-statistic. Finally the threshold zones, as given from the classification tree, are to
be identified. The parameters are then linked back to the PEPSRs, so as to guide the designers
into the process of reviewing the single features, and attempt to move those functioning
points away from those identified, by the threshold analysis, as critical. In this stage, the
visualization of the scatterplots could provide further insights and help in the
interpretation of the results obtained.
The study conducted for this document, attempts to propose a method distinguished by: a
coherent approach to the problem, given by the steady use of statistical tools throughout the
analyses; a robust output, promoted by the continuous cross validation of each step (LR vs CT,
Vensim vs Goldsim, p-value test vs Wald Test, etc); a simple interpretation of its results
achieved through the extensive use of graphs and scatter-plots; its computational ease as
perceived by the relatively small processing time (1-2 hours) as opposed to pre-existing methods
(-16 hours).
The use of this methodology has been verified and illustrated by mean of the three
examples reported in the next Section. Note that the iterations loops given in the diagram, which
aim to improve the efficiency of the method, were not tested in this work.
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Following are two examples which were used in order to both, illustrate the methodology
and to prove its efficacy when applied to reliability studies.
The first example is purely illustrative and shows the GFR's core failure under an
induced thermal shock. Despite the low occurrence of this accident, - due to the unlikelihood of a
loss in the capacity to transfer heat from the fuel to the coolant - the example remains credible
and provides interesting insights to the combined CT - LR technique. In particular, deciphering
the scatter-plots resulting from sensitivity analysis provides relevant information which shall be
discussed in detail.
The second example uses a high-level code, RELAP5-3D, to model a more realistic
scenario: the transient phase of a Loss of Coolant Accident (LOCA) in a GFR. The apparent
advantages of studying a more plausible accident are tempered by the necessarily reduced
number of available samples to analyze.
The third example provides insights and clarifications on the Latin Hypercube Sampling
method (LHS) used to collect the data, and it investigates the relationship existing between the
results provided by the predictors and the way the dataset has been created for the LHS.
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3. RESULTS
EXAMPLE I: Core Failure of the GFR as due to a Negative Heat Pulse
The model
The example is based on the GFRDYNLUMPED model presented in the first part of
this work. It will now be tested to check for variations in the number of failures as due to
uncertainties in the fundamental parameters constituting the model.
In order to save computational time and to better illustrate the methodology, only a
portion, or module, of the original model's structure was selected (the core sub-model) and it is
shown in form of a Vensim sketch in Figure 11. The core's sub-model shown in the figure has
been "disconnected" from the remaining ECCS-HXC sub-model and therefore it is exogenous in
mass flow rate and inlet temperature of the core.
Figure 11: Vensim Sketch of the molecule describing the GFR core under the selected transient.
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The Accident and the Computational Time Required Running the Scenarios
A pulse heat is set to occur for an interval of 1000 seconds at the 450 seconds mark from
the selected initial time. The pulse simulates a loss in the capacity of the fuel to transfer heat to
the gas within the core. As previously mentioned, the mechanism that would generate the
hypothesized loss in the capacity of heat transmission, is not provided here; the aim is to present
an accidental scenario, which would be capable of calculating the probability of failure4 for the
sytem, in a reasonable computational time, and with a sufficient number of realizations. The
number of runs provided for this case has been settled to be 10,000, so around 10 times more
than those completed for Example 2. Note that the computational time required to obtain the
10,000 realizations in this example is of approx 1 hour, while by running the same example with
the complete GFRDYN_LUMPED model or with the RELAP5-3D code of Example 2, it would
respectively be of 24 hours and 160 hours. The comparison in terms of computational times is
possible by taking into account that the two sets of simulations were executed by means of the
same sampling algorithm (Latin Hypercube). The final time for both simulations is 10,000
seconds, with a time-step of less than 1/100 second. Figure 12 shows the temperature of the core
during one realization.
2.000
1,500
2 1,ooo
500
0
i i I i............
i~,c- · · · ~~~·i·~~--------------i·
............  ............ .................... . ... ..... .............    
550 1075 1600 2125 2650 3175 3700 4225 4750 5275 5800 6325 6850 7375 7900 8425 8950 9475 10000
TiTr (S.Coad)
T C ore : pul e e T C o e : ref ....................................................................................................................................
Figure 12: Temperature of the GFR core during a LOCA as obtained by the core's sub-model. Reference
Case (bottom red line) and Forced Pulse Heat Case (upper blue peaked line).
4 Note that now, the probability of failure of the plant is doubly conditioned (given that a LOCA take place and that
an interruption of the transmission between fuel and gas occurs in the gas). Therefore the probability of failure of the
cladding provided in this section does not represent the real failure probability of the plant if we do not multiply the
result for the two conditioning events.
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Uncertainties Quantification
The model, shown in Figure 11, has been tested by varying three fundamental parameters,
each with a different source of uncertainty. Distributions of Figure 13 were chosen arbitrarily but
within acceptable ranges:
The specific heat of the carbon dioxide, Cp gas = input uncertainty;
The heat transfer coefficient of the core, HTC[Core] = model uncertainty;
The initial temperature of the core, T Fuel 0 = initial / boundary conditions uncertainty.
Figure 13: Input dataset used to model the HTC [Core], Cp and Initial temperature in the fuel.
The table below summarizes the values for the selected distributions with respect to the reference
case (Best Estimate value, BE, or most likely value).
Table 6:Input Parameter Distribution Table
Range BestParameter SHAPE Range Best Mean Std dev Skewness KurtosisEstimate
TRIANGULAR
CP
J/(K-kg)
200-600 536 445.33 87.717 NA NA
LOGNORMAL
HTC " 50-600
100 300 100 1.037 4.9713
W/KIm2
Initial UNIFORM
Temp
Core
K
L _ _ _ I._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ I __ _ _ __ _ _ J __ _ __ _ ±
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Resulting Output from the Dynamic Model
The output resulting from LHS, and expressed in terms of Probability Density Functions
(PDF) for the core average and for the hottest channel, are shown in Figure 15. The
corresponding realizations, in form of single runs are given in Figure 14. The failure criterion for
the plant is to pass the boundary limit given by the maximum allowable temperature of either the
cladding, 1473 K- as shown by the upper limit line of Figure 14 -or of the fuel, 2200 K.
'C•,u•:WWir
,000 [r
Figure 14: Temperature of the cladding in 200 realizations and deterministic cladding limits.
The final probability of failure for the plant would be given by the intersection of the
single failure probabilities of the two distinct systems (cladding and fuel). In this example no
evidence of the failure of the fuel was found and therefore considered as a single failure problem.
900 1000 1100 1200 1300 1400 1000 1600 1700 1800
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Figure 15: Output distributions of the fuel temperature for the average and hottest channels of the GFR.
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Creating the Dataset for the Prediction Models
The results, in terms of failures, obtained from the core of the GFRDYN LUMPED
model, have been transformed into a logic response which equals a 1 when the single realization
curve passes the boundaries given by the adopted failure criterion, or a 0 otherwise. In order to
create the dataset for the classification models, the obtained response must be coupled with the
input deck given by the LHS algorithm. Thus, the second step is to arrange on the same row of a
matrix the 3 values sampled from the characteristic distributions of Figure 13, followed by the
binary failure response associated with that run. This procedure is repeated for a number of rows
equal to the number of realizations sampled from the dynamic model. The so constructed matrix,
which in this case is made of 4 columns and 10,000 rows, now constitutes the dataset used as
input for the classification models. Table 7 shows the first 20 realizations of the dataset which was
obtained by following the explained procedure. The dataset is then going to be processed by the
classification model which will associate the input columns to the response column by mean of
an algorithm which depends on the nature of the classifier adopted to conduct the analysis.
Table 7: Dataset matrix used as an input for the classifiers.
Simulation Amplitude Pulse Cp gas HTC Core T core 0 T Counter Cladding response
1 547.5 327 281 607.9 0 0
2 508.9 228.6 499.4 554.3 0 0
3 469.7 360.6 373.4 593.7 0 0
4 430.3 505.8 149.4 638.5 0 0
5 446.3 233.8 397.8 605.9 0 0
6 577.9 303.4 411 451.9 0 0
7 563.3 285.8 499.8 519.7 0 0
8 415.7 208.6 162.2 494.5 0 0
9 529.3 553.8 201.4 575.9 0 0
10 521.3 383 423 510.1 0 0
11 502.5 489.8 313 465.9 0 0
12 539.7 599.8 441 609.5 0 0
13 460.3 340.6 263 456.3 0 0
14 578.5 478.6 155.8 632.7 241.208 1
15 412.1 415.4 330.2 490.7 0 0
16 563.9 535.4 194.2 523.1 0 0
17 595.3 280.6 427 521.1 0 0
18 476.5 393.4 335.4 537.5 0 0
19 538.9 336.6 101.8 498.5 568.579 1
20 406.5 386.6 341 581.9 0 0
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Results from the Classification Models
By entering the dataset acquired from the dynamic simulator into the classification model
of Figure 10, we can start exploring the sensitivity of the model to previously selected
parameters. For the case of the logistic classifier, the model would now have the form of the
equation:
P
Y = ,0 + /•,X, + 6 = 0 +3PHTC"HTC[Core]+P3f"T Fuel 0"+fcp,"Cp gas"+s . Eq. 24
i=1
The logistic classifier returns the importance of the single parameters concurring to the
output. As shown in Table 8, the parameter's estimates are given in the first column along with
their standard errors. The standard error for an estimate is a measure of its variability. If the
standard error for a coefficient is small in comparison to the magnitude of the coefficient
estimate, then the estimate is fairly precise. The third and the fourth column describe the results
from the t-statistic test and their corresponding p-values. The p-value for each t-statistic indicates
whether the corresponding coefficient is significant to the model. In general, if the p-value is less
than 0.05 the t-statistic is greater than 1.96; this result suggests that the coefficient is indeed
significant. The Term Importance of Table 8 shows the weight of each variable in the model. In
general, this type of table is used to confirm and validate the results coming from LR estimation.
For categorical variables the Wald statistic provides another measure of how much the selected
variables contribute to the model. The probability of the Wald statistic is based on a Chi-squared
approximation 5 which usually is in agreement with the results provided by the p-test (see also
section 2.5.3).
Based on the above explanations, Table 8 confirms the expected absolute importance of
the first parameter, HTC [Core], which dominates the dependent binary variable, failure of the
cladding. The other parameters are clearly above the p-test cut-off value of 0.05 and thus confirm
their total lack of influence on the failure of the cladding during the analyzed transient. The
result is confirmed by the value of the Wald statistic for the HTC [Core] parameter, which is two
orders of magnitude higher than any of the remaining fundamental parameters.
s The Wald statistic for a variable is the square of the t-statistic. The Wald statistic is useful for categorical
independent variables where there is a coefficient for each class level and the coefficient t-statistic shows the
significance of each class level, making it difficult to assess how the variable contributes to the model as a whole.
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The next step, as given from step 7.c of the milestone list of section 2.4, is to exclude
from the analysis the parameters which are not statistically significant and rank the remaining
ones sorted by mean of their p-values.
Table 9 provides the misclassification matrices for both the methodologies and the output
agreements between the two classification techniques of LR and CT. The logistic predictor
succeeds in capturing the failures - labeled as l's - with an agreement equal to 148/155 = 95.5 %
while the classification tree shows an even higher agreement of 98.7%.
Table 9: Classification Agreement Table
Input Node - Logistic Prediction (8) Input Node - Classification Tree Prediction (9)
Misclassification Matrix Misclassification Matrix
Predicted Totals Predicted Totals
0 1 0 1
Observed 0 4843 2 4845 0 4840 5 4845Observed Observed
1 7 148 155 1 2 153 155
Totals 4850 150 5000 Totals 4842 158 5000
% Agree % Agree
Observed Overall Observed Overall
0 1 0 1
% Agree 100.00% 95.50% 99.80% % Agree 99.90% 98.70% 99.90%
Positive Category - 1 Positive Category - 1
Recall Precision F-Measure Recall Precision F-Measure
95.50% 98.70% 97.00% 98.70% 96.80% 97.80%
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Table 8: Summary Statistics from the Logistic Classifier
Coefficient Estimates Term Importance
WaldVariable Estimate Std.Err. t-Statistic Pr(ItI) Statistic DF Pr
(Intercept) 65.8 6.05 10.88 0 - - -
HTC[Core] -0.42 0.04 -11.99 1.17E-32 143.67 1 0
T fuel 0 3.70E-04 3.73E-03 0.1 0.92 2.3 1 0.13
Cp gas 0.007 2.42E-03 -1.52 0.13 0.01 1 0.92
The precision in the two measures is deemed as accurate, because higher than 95% in
both the models and for each of the tests executed (lower tables of Table 9). Therefore, any
conclusion based on the predictions returned by the CT or LR classifiers are to be considered
reliable. Similar conclusions about the role played by the single parameters can be argued by
looking at the results coming from the misclassification matrix of the classification tree in Figure
16. However, the classification tree provides extra information on the values around which the
parameters - deemed important by the logistic classifier - start to show their influence on the
dependent variable 'Failure of the Cladding'. Figure 16 shows the structure of the classification
tree: the splits in the tree structure provide the threshold values for the parameters in regards to
the failure of the cladding. The nodes in the hierarchical view show the distribution of the classes
in that node in a colored rectangle. The bottom right panel of Figure 16 reports the expanded,
hierarchical view of the tree. The top panel displays the tree in form of a dendrogram: the tree is
drawn such that the depth of the each branch is proportional to the change in the fitting criteria
between the node and the sum of the two children nodes. This provides a quick visual of the
importance of each split.
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Figure 16: Classification tree for the dependent variable temperature of the cladding as a
function of the three independent variables HTC, Cp, Initial Temp of the Fuel.
In this case, the CT returns, as expected from the results of the LR, that the only
significant parameter is 'HTC[Core]' but it also provides the extra-information of the value
around which 'HTC[Core]' is going to dominate the failure mechanism. The threshold values
which lead the cladding to fail, are in this case two, 157.14 and 153.84 W/(K*m2), and they are
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identified directly by the tree structure and can be easily visualized. The tree in this case
confirms the importance of 'HTC' and thus validate the results coming from the LR classifier.
Analysis of the Scatter Plots
Finally the scatter plots of Figure 17, Figure 18 and Figure 19, provide insight on the
potential of the method described here; the parameters identified as important because relevant
from a statistical point of view, have merits in leading the plant to failure. On the other hand, the
parameters which are non-relevant do not show any particular pattern in the scatter plots. This
can be easily observed in Figure 17 where by plotting the two "irrelevant" parameters 'Cp gas'
and 'T fuel 0' we do not find evidence of patterns for the failures occurring in the plant. More
interesting conclusions can be deduced by observing Figure 18 where the scatter plots of 'Cp
gas' versus 'HTC[Core]' show a lateral left stripe where failures are definitely most likely to
occur. Figure 19 combines the information gained by the tree with the thresholds obtained
through use of a CT and identifies the values which confine the "failure strip" from the
remaining zones of the scatter plot: the two vertical bold lines are delimiting the two values of
157.14 and 153.84 measured in W/(K*m 2).
Figure 17: Scatter plot of the Specific heat for CO 2 versus Initial Temperature of the fuel.
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Figure 18: Scatter plot of the specific heat for CO2 versus Heat Transfer Coefficient in the core.
Figure 19: Scatter plot of the initial temperature of the fuel versus the heat transfer coefficient in the core.
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Findings
In conclusion, it must be pointed out, that despite the proposed example did not seem to
be particularly engaging because of its easy nature, the proposed analysis allowed to:
* Efficiently identify the parameters which weighted the most in the determining of the final
failure probability of the plant. This was done by using as a criterion of classification the
individual statistical significance of the parameters through the response of a logistic model.
* Evaluate the statistical significance of the dataset in use as obtained by both the classification
techniques through the evaluation of the capability of prediction of the models given by their
misclassification matrixes. In this case, in fact, both models provided evidence of the absolute
importance played by the fundamental parameter 'HTC[Core]'.
* Identify and visually present the zones in which the parameters are most likely leading the plant
to failure. This was done by means of a classification tree which determines the thresholds lines
used to mark the failure regions on the scatter-plots returned by LHS.
Note that the number of possible scatterplots obtainable from LHS is equal to the number
of pairs of the dependent variables in the model. In our example we selected three dependent
variables which returned only three scatterplots. As the complexity of the model passes to a
higher number of parameters, the number of fundamental parameters which can affect the
measured output, in turn increases too. Therefore realistic models, with higher degree of
complexity, could lead to the examination of huge number of scatterplots. A way to discriminate
and select among all the possible scatterplots is to choose only those scatterplots which consider
two statistically, or at least one, significant parameters. This could be done, in the current
example, by excluding Figure 10 from the analysis. This aspect will be remarked in Example II.
This final observation leads to conclude that the p-test measure by the LR model also:
* Provides a criterion to select those scatterplots which most likely are going to contain
information useful to individuate patterns in the parameters leading the system to failure.
The criterion is based on the p-test responses of the LR model.
The following example will check the above conclusion with a more realistic case
and extending the analysis from the core to the entire GFR plant.
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EXAMPLE II: Leakage from a Check Valve in a Helium Cooled GFR
The Model
This example provides a more realistic application of the methodology explained in this
Section. The dataset in use has been adopted from a recent work developed at MIT on a 2-DHR-
loop GFR helium cooled plant [F. MacKay et al., 2007]. The simulations presented here were
carried out with the RELAP5-3D code. A set of six input parameters were selected to be
propagated throughout the model. The selection was made based on sensitivity analyses done on
several parameters and on expert opinion. Table 10 reports these parameters along with their
probability distribution functions.
Table 10: Selected Input Parameters and their probability distributions [adopted from F. MacKay et al., 2007].
Extreme Values
Input Parameter Distribution Extreme Values Units Correspond To Percentiles
Lower Upper Lower Upper
Core Roughness Lognormal 1.00E-05 1.00E-04 [m] 5 85
DHR1 Check Valve
Exponential - 0.5 [kg/s] - 80Leakage
DHR2 Check ValveDHR2 l  Exponential 
- 0.5 [kg/s] 
- 80
Leakage
Heat Transfer
Coefficient,Co ent Lognormal 0.5 2 [Dmnl] 20 75Containment
Structures
Moment of Inertia of Normal 656.88 802.86 [kg*m2] 20 80the Shaft
Core Heat TransferCore ransfe  Lognormal 0.4 1.6 [Dmnl] 20 80Coefficient
The Selected Accident
A LOCA on the cold leg of the PCU was chosen as the initiating event of the analysis.
The system, originally designed to survive a 500 cm2 break, was evaluated for a small break of 5
cm2 because of its higher incidence (frequency: -10-3 per year) over a larger one.
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Failure Modes and Sampling Techniques
After reviewing the parameters of the system at various points, two failures modes were
selected for the reliability evaluation of the system: cladding damage in the hot channel and
structural failure in the hot legs of the DHR loops. The analysis reported in this example refers to
the second failure mode, while the first failure mode is not analyzed here because of the low
number of failures relative to the number of trials available (the original dataset had in fact only
13 failures of the cladding which were independent and thus not correlated to the second failure
mode). A limit of 1123 K for the maximum temperature in the hot legs (MTHL) was set as the
failure criterion for this mode.
In order to reduce the number of trials, also in this example Latin Hypercube Sampling
(LHS) was employed to propagate the uncertainties in the input parameters throughout the
model. Figure 20 shows two sets of 128 realizations for each of the two DHR loops analyzed, for
a total of 256 realizations. The horizontal dashed line corresponds to the DHR temperature limit
for the materials used in the GFR helium plant. There were 26 curves that exceeded the limit, so
the overall probability for this failure mode, conditional on the LOCA, is 26/128= 0.2.
The decreasing curves correspond to the DHR loop with the check valve closed. In the
initial conditions of the simulation, the MTHL is set as if there was no leakage in either loop.
This is the worst possible initial condition because the MTHL is smaller with leakage than
without. This is due to the fact that the leaking helium comes from the downcomer and passes
through the water-cooled heat exchanger where it cools down substantially. Additional
explanations for the behavior observed in the graph can be found in [F. MacKay et al., 2007].
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Figure 20: Realizations for the Maximum Temperature in the Hot Leg of DHR Loops [F. MacKay et al., 2007].
Results from the Classification Models
The dataset was used as an input to the logistic and tree classification models. The two
models were tried with 70% of the 128 simulations available. The results are listed in Table 11
and Table 12 where the summary statistics and the compared classification agreements are
reported. From Table 11 it can be inferred that the only two parameters leading the plant to
failure are given by 'Max leakage' and 'HTCS' as provided by the value of their p-test. The
values of the Wald statistics are in agreement with the results coming from the p-test.
Table 11: Summary Statistics from the Logistic Classifier
Coefficient Estimates Term Importance
Wald
Variable Estimate Std.Err. t-Statistic Pr( tI) Statistic DF Pr
(Intercept) 1.56 4.34 0.36 0.72 
- -
Roughness 522.99 7,571.49 0.07 0.95 7.58 1 0.01
Max leakage -6.61 2.4 -2.75 0.01 4.09 1 0.04
HTCS 0.49 0.24 2.02 0.05 1.09 1 0.3
HTCC 0.23 0.31 0.74 0.46 0.55 1 0.46
Rupture Form Factor -2.96 2.84 -1.04 0.3 4.77E-03 1 0.94
Shaft Moment Inertia 3.08E-04 4.52E-03 0.07 0.95 4.65E-03 1 0.95
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Table 12 does not deny this result, but instead highlights the very low capacity of the
model to predict failures as documented by the values of agreement: 27.3% and 45.5%
respectively for the logistic and the tree model. This result is reflected in the uncertainty of the
obtained failure probability for MTHL: the 26 curves indicating failures shown in Figure 20 are
subjected to an uncertainty which is proportional to the observed percentage of agreement of the
predictor model in use. The low values observed in the percentage to predict failures from both
models is because predictions are based on the values used to test the dataset and thus equal to
just 30% of the total samplings. Therefore the numbers of failures analyzed by the LR and CT
models are 11 out of a total of 38 samplings used to validate the model. This problem could be
solved by either, increasing the number of samples, or by increasing the validation dataset. The
former solution stresses the need of a higher number of realizations in order to identify possible
patterns in the parameters leading the plant to failure. The latter solution indirectly lead to the
same conclusion, because in order to avoid oversampling effects (which is the loss of the
capability to predict patterns which are different from those given by the training dataset) it is
required to increase the number of simulations in both the validation and the training sets.
Table 12: Classification Agreement Table
Input Node - Logistic Prediction (8) Input Node - Classification Tree Prediction (9)
Predicted Totals Predicted Totals
0 1 0 1
Observed 0 26 1 27 Observed 0 25 2 27
1 8 3 11 I 6 5 11
Totals 4 34 38 Totals 31 7 38
Observed Overall Observed Overall
0 1 0 1
% Agree 96.30% 27.30% 76.30% % Agree 92.60% 45.50% 78.90%
Positive Category - 1 Positive Category - 1
Recall Precision F-Measure Recall Precision F-Measure
27.30% 75.00% 40.00% 45.50% 71.40% 55.60%
Despite the mentioned scarcity of points (measures), the classification dendrogram
portrayed in Figure 21 gives the information needed to confine the zones where failures are most
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likely to occur. The tree is obtained by considering the statistically significant parameters
obtained by the logistic regression. Therefore Figure 22 is acquired by plotting the dependent
output variable, failure of the hot leg, distinguished by its binary connotation, on a scatter-plot as
a function of the two variables identified as statistically significant from the p-test. The vertical
line corresponds to the threshold value of 0.63 for the maximum leakage as given by the second
split of the dendrogram of Figure 21. The horizontal line represents the threshold limit for the
HTCS parameter as obtained from the first split of Figure 21 and equals to 0.93. It can also be
noticed that for values of 'max leakage' below 0.63, the tree splits into two distinct clusters of
failures identified by the threshold value of 0.22 for 'max leakage'. Due to the low number of
samples available, it is not given to know if these two separate zones could merge into a unique
failure region or remain divided into two different clusters. It is then spontaneous to ask if the
results coming from a 128 datasets could be considered definitive or not for the CT classifier.
This will be seen in Example III which reports a series of investigations aimed to determine the
dynamics of the failures as obtained by increasing the number of realizations along with other
information regarding the uncertainty in the measured probability of failure. For the moment, the
conclusion here is that, once again the sampling size reveals to be of fundamental importance to
substantiate some of the behaviors identified by the combined use of LR and CT models.
Figure 21: Classification tree resulting from LHS sampling of six parameters in the Helium GFR.
70 Page
Split Decision Score Number Records Misclassifications Entropy Probabilities CLASSIFICATION TREE MODEL: "response" (1 tree)
NUMBER OBSERVATIONS: 90
I 17 87.23 [0.81 0.19 ]
CURRENT TREE:1
0.93 0 36 0 0.00 [1.00 0.00 ]
0= 83 0 54 
17 67 27 
O BS 0 31
x leakage,=0.63 0 14 0 0.00 [1.00 0.00 ]
x leakage<0.63 0 40 17 54.55 [0.58 0.d2 ]
max leakage>=0.22 0 28 9 35.16 [0.68 0.32 ]
max leakage0.22 1 12 4 15.28 [0.33 0.67 ]
Classes:
0I
Classes:m
°
4
I
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Figure 22: Scatter plot of the heat transfer coefficient versus Maximum Leakage for the Helium GFR.
Findings
As before, this example strengthens with evidence the competence of the proposed
method when dealing with responses coming from sensitivity analyses computed by varying
multiple parameters and then measuring the effects of their uncertainty propagation during a
transient.
* The possibility of its extension to a problem with a higher degree of difficulty has been shown
by providing an efficient and fast way to screen the output as identified from the selected failure
mode.
* In particular, the method showed through clear evidence that classification models can
efficiently be applied to predict the probability of failure of a given system only when a
sufficient number of samplings is available.
* The logistic regression model revealed to be a suitable tool to discriminate the parameters
concurring to the final probability of failure of the system analyzed.
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* In addition, the visual representation, in form of scatterplot of the variables screened by the
p-test criterion, agreed with the results coming from the classification tree (despite its low
prediction capability).
Note that this example is using 6 fundamental parameters and this would result in 15
possible scatterplots, as obtainable form the different pair combinations of these parameters,
despite that, just 1 scatterplot has been selected; this has been done by following the p-test
criterion identified in the previous example and thus, in this case, by including in the visual
analysis only those combinations arising by coupling the parameters passing the p-test. This
criterion offers a more structured visualization of the results than the one that could be obtained,
as done in Example I, by portraying in the scatterplots only one significant variable. This is in
fact allows to identify two-dimensional patterns of the failures and therefore to capture behaviors
which are less intuitive than the ones offered by screening the behavior of a single parameter.
Further research is needed to identify the relationships between the number of
realizations and the accuracy of the returned probability of failure, PF, and the resulting
patterns of the failures among all the possible system states. Example III illustrates a
possible approach to explore these relations by means of a simple explanatory model.
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EXAMPLE HI: Explanatory Example about LHS
Introduction
The example is introduced in the form of a set of observations commented on a case by
case basis. These comments are a consequence of calculations performed on either the LHS
dataset obtained for Examples I and II, or on separate numerical examples which also sustain the
findings of the first two examples.
To support the considerations reported in the current example, a broad review of the basic
definitions shared by authorities in the field, fundamental statistic theorems, and general
properties of LHS, has been necessary.
The two previously mentioned analyses - Example I and Example II- differ, besides in
their different degree of complexity, mainly in the number of available simulations, 10,000 and
128 respectively. Their relative conclusions, from a statistical perspective, are more or less
prejudiced by this factor, and as a consequence, the accuracy of the measured PF is proportional
to the value of M too. The following example has, therefore, been named "the explanatory
example" because its aim is to provide a correct formalism for the definition of the probability of
failure, PF, as it varies with the number of realizations M. This last factor as a matter of fact
influences not only the credibility of the results, or the uncertainty on the measured PF, but also
the capacity to accurately model the pattern followed by the failures when M increases.
Evidence of both these effects (and of the relationship between the two), was indirectly shown by
comparing the first two examples, and will be investigated here through further analyses. Before
venturing into this matter, a basic definition for the PF is required and will be recalled later on in
this work. Let A, be a binary variable that is equal to 1 when the i-th realization leads to failure,
and equal to 0 otherwise. If M is the total number of realizations, then the probability of failure
of a given system S can be defined as:
M
pFs -=_ Eq. 25M
Some basic definition about the LHS need also to be pointed out and are given along with
the first of the observations driving the explanation of the actual exercise.
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Latin Hypercube Properties
Two among the main theoretical benefits in the use of LHS, are that:
* Its estimates are unbiased. This means that LHS reduces the variance of the results as the
number of trials increases.
* that the expected variance is reduced, or asymptotically lower, than that obtainable from
canonical Monte Carlo samplings [McKay et al.,1979].
The first statement is well accepted and evidence of it can be found in the literature. But
if it is credible and proven that LHS reduces the variance, it remains yet to demonstrate how
many trials are necessary for this reduction to be significant. This of course depends on: the
nature of the problem, and thus from the presence of non-linearities in the model; the number
and shape of the distributions selected; and, ultimately from the number of samplings available.
A measure of the variance reduction can be obtained by plotting the relative variations of the PF,
as a function of the increasing number of trials. Figure 23 compares this measure for the first 400
runs to the full number of runs, and it clearly shows the reduction of the variability for higher
numbers of M. The first 400 runs present steep variations of PF which progressively smooth to
zero, roughly, in the first 5 steps, corresponding to 5*20=100 runs; the result is maintained for
the remaining number of runs. Therefore the second statement is confirmed.
Figure 23: Measured PF deltas on the first 400 trials compared to the whole 10,000 sequence.
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The first observation recalls Example I and refers to the PF obtained from 10,000
realizations.
Observation I: the stratified method of sampling provided by LHS effectively reduces the
variance with an increase in the number of realizations and confirms the expected properties of
the algorithm as expressed by the second statement.
Figure 24: PF of the cladding for 2000 simulations. Data are collected every 20 trials.
The first statement asserts that the LHS is unbiased. As illustrated by Figure 24 and
Figure 25, the probability of failure, obtained from the plant configuration of Example I, shows a
systematic decrease of PF, even for a significantly high number of trials. This result is in
contradiction with the expected convergence of the LHS after a low number of trials.
Despite this, the range of variation is not remarkable and does not affect the outcome (the
returned probability of failure). The PF stays in a narrow corridor of values which, as shown in
Figure 24, goes from just above 2.00E-02 to 5.00-E02 and that, for the case of a higher number
of trials as shown in Figure 25, tries to stabilize around a value of 3.00E-02. Therefore, for a high
number of simulations, the value around which the algorithm is going to converge can be
inferred, though it cannot be accurately predicted, from the first few hundred trials. Note that
these and the remark that follow, refer to the specific case studied in Example I.
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Figure 25: PF of the cladding for 10,000 simulations. Data is collected every 500 trials.
Observation II: for a low number of trials the LHS returns an estimate value of the PF
which, despite being representative of the actual PF predicted from a higher number of trials, has
a low confidence level. Table 13 reports the first 140 samplings used to determine the probability
of failure in Example 1 and shows that the first 60 samplings could position the result close to
the expected value of 3.00E-02 corresponding to the convergence value of Figure 25.
This result implies that the value provided by a limited number of realizations, as in the
case of the 128 runs of Example II, does not correspond to the final definitive value of the PF for
that given system. The main finding is, therefore, that for a low number of trials the value
returned by LHS is slightly biased and even though this effect has an apparent low impact on the
final result of Example I, it has nonetheless some implications. These are reported in the next
observations.
Observation II could play a bigger role by relaxing some of the assumptions of Example
I, such as the shape and number of the distributions concurring to the final PF of the system, the
nature of the problem under analysis, and the single failure criterion identified for the
temperature of the cladding. In other words, when the complexity of the problem increases, the
low confidence measured on the output can be amplified by those factors neglected by the initial
assumptions on the problem. The next observations analyze the single factors in details.
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Table 13: Probabilities of failure, PF, obtained from 140 Latin Hypercube samplings.
Number of Trials M Number of failures Nf PF delta PF
0 0 0.00E+00
20 1 5.00E-02 5.E-02
40 1 2.50E-02 -3.E-02
60 2 3.33E-02 8.E-03
80 3 3.75E-02 4.E-03
100 4 4.00E-02 3.E-03
120 4 3.33E-02 -7.E-03
140 5 3.57E-02 2.E-03
Observation III: the value of the probability of failure of a system, PF, obtained by LHS
sampling is the reference value for a distribution whose shape in turns depends on the
distributions of the selected uncertain parameters from which we sample. Thus, the value of the
PF as given in Eq. 25 is actually a reference value for a probability density function of PF. That
reference value, in general, is not the most likely value or average value of the PF distributions if
not under special hypotheses. These hypotheses are summarized in this and in the next two
observations.
Observation IV: the value of the probability of failure of a system, PF, depends on the
number of parameters the LHS is sampling from, relative to the number of trials available.
Observation V: all of the above observations depend on the specific nature of the
physical problem under analysis as well as from the complexity of the overall model used to
describe the system under study.
In order to give evidence of observations from III through V a simple model has been
built. In other words, observations III through V are illustrated by means of a set of auxiliary
calculations executed on a proposed mathematical model. Although any simulation problem
could have been used to provide evidence for these observations, the use of the simple model
was preferred because of the lower computational time. Secondly, results can be easily extended
to structured designs and real codes.
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Model Description
The model is made up by the weighted sum of five parameters. The returned sum is the
measured input, which, by construction, is linear with regards to the five fundamental inputs. A
second model was obtained by squaring the results coming from the previous model. This results
in a non-linear model. LHS is used to sample the five parameters and build the outputs under
different set of the hypotheses that were remarked in the last three observations. The results
surfacing from the different sets of simulations support the observations.
Common to both models are the input datasets, summarized in the table below, and their
weights, set to be all equal to 0.5. Results are given in the form of three different sets of
simulations, each of them capturing different properties and connotations of the studied problem.
Dependent Variables 1: Dataset Uniform Dependent Variables 2: Input Non -Uniform
Inputs[inputl ]=RANDOM_UNIFORM[I, 0) Inputs[input5]=RANDOM_UNIFORM[O0,10)
Inputs[input5]=RANDOM_UNIFORMO,1 0] Inputs[input3]=RANDOM_UNIFORM[O0,1 0)
Inputs[input4]=RAN D 0 M_UNIFORM(0,10) Inputs[inputl ]=RANDO 0 M_T R IAN G U LAR (0,10,50,60,70)
Inputs[input3]=RAND0 MUNIFORM(0,10) Inputs[input2]=RANDOM_POISSON[ ,10,5,0.1,0.1]
Inputs[input2]=RANDOM_UNIFO RM ,10) Inputs[input4]=RANDOM_NORMAL(0,1 0,5,0.1]
Model 1: Linear Model 2: Non - linear
Y=W 1X1+W2X2+w3X3+w4X4+w5X5  Y=(WlX1+w2X2+W3X3+w4X4+w5X5)2
Weights Weights
W1=1W2=W3=W4=W5=0.5 W1=1w2=W3=W4=W5=0.5
The dependent variable Y reported in the table, it will be shown, it can be imagined as the
measured load of a T-H problem in a particular instant of time. By means of the analogy between
this load and the loads of the two previous examples (the temperatures of the cladding and of the
ECCSs' structures) some interesting properties of the calculations, used by the established
methodology of Section 2, can be derived and inspected.
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Table 14: Input datasets and Models used for the calculations provided in Example III.
Results
As a first experiment, LHS was performed on both models by varying the shape of the
curve associated with the input distributions and by showing the returned outputs as a function of
the number of trials, M. The conclusions illustrated below are in support of Observation III and
V.
Table 15: Distribution parameters for two different input datasets: uniform versus non-uniform.
Output Linear
Trials Median Mean StDev
UNIF non UNIF UNIF non UNIF UNIF non UNIF
20 12.625 10.22035122 10.319 12.5 3.980813 3.980813
60 12.83333397 10.70901012 10.3179 12.5 3.345966 3.345966
400 12.5 10.31872845 10.3024 12.5 3.237578 3.237578
10,000 12.49100018 10.3074913 12.5 10.29836559 3.246991 2.517422
Output Non Linear
Trials Median Mean StDev
UNIF non UNIF UNIF non UNIF UNIF non UNIF
20 159.390625 104.5316925 172.097 109.6435623 99.28466 38.01127
60 164.7795105 114.6829376 167.445 112.3515396 83.9911 48.59884
400 156.250351 106.4761887 166.732 112.4572372 82.32822 51.9342
10,000 156.0250854 106.2443848 166.793 112.3937607 82.16286 52.37802
Figure 26 compares the outputs obtained by the simulations which were carried out using
sample size M values ranging from the very low value of 20 to the extremely high value of
10,000. This array enables to weigh the effect of the sample size on results; however, in practice,
the typical values available to work with in standard reliability calculations fall in the lower
range, from 60 to 400. The output is expressed in terms of the probability density function (PF)
as it is measured at any given time. By recalling the simple mathematical definitions of the
outputs given in this example, we treat them as time invariant variables. Therefore, we could
translate the obtained curves into a proxy value for the load calculated in a typical T-H problem
at steady state. The load is thus calculated first from an initial set of five identically uniformly
distributed inputs, and then from generically distributed inputs, chosen as indicated in Table 14.
The red curves of Figure 26 represent the loads given by the first set, while the blue curves those
from the second set. The left and right columns are differentiated by the type of model used
(respectively linear and non-linear).
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Figure 26: Shape Distribution Effects on linear and non linear models as a function of the number of samplings, M.
Two distinct effects are clearly visible and then confirmed by the characteristic values
reported in Table 15:
The shape of the curves changes as a function of the mathematical definition given to the
model. In addition, the curves shown in the left of the figure have a shape close to a
normal distribution, while the right ones seem closer to a "lognormal" one.
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By comparing the blue and the red graphs in each plot, it can be seen how the curves shift
to the right when going from a uniform input set to a generically distributed dataset. This
effect is more obvious in the 10,000 samplings case.
Finally, by comparing the upper and the lower plots, it can be seen how the two effects are more
marked for the cases with the higher number of simulations than for that with few samples.
The first effect is explainable by recalling the central limit theorem that states that the
linear combination of a given set of probability density functions returns a normal distributed
PDF regardless of the original shapes of such distributions [Art B. Owen, 1992]. While, for non
linear combinations of the same parameters, the shape of the resulting output is not, a priori,
related to any pre-assigned shape.
The second effect is interesting for the implications it has in terms of failure probability.
In fact, if we assume, as already mentioned, that the output distribution can be seen as a proxy
for the load of a possible T-H problem, and that a deterministic failure criterion is assigned to
describe the capacity of the system, the failure probability PF is then given by the right green
areas of Figure 27. As shown in the figures, due to the shift generated in the load PDFs, the
resulting probability of failure is increased as passing the non-uniform to the uniform dataset.
The validity of the illustrated results is still functional to M and to the structure of the model.
Figure 27: Load distribution and Capacity for the linear and non linear cases (left and right graphs)for M=10,000.
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In a second experiment, the probability of failure obtained by using identical failure
criteria for the linear and non linear case and analyzed by means of the two different input
datasets are reported in the following table. Results are reported as a function of the two extreme
values of M equal to 20 and 10,000.
Table 16: Probability of failures as a function of M for the four different cases.
M 20 10,000
lin Non-lin lin Non-lin
Non Uniform = NU 1.50E-01 5.00E-02 7.94E-02 5.00E-02
Uniform =U 3.50E-01 5.00E-02 3.27E-01 5.00E-02
total max PF 5.00E-01 1.00E-01 4.06E-01 1.00E-01
Table 16 shows clearly once again, that even in this proxy problem the values of the PFs
for the two models (linear, Lin and non-linear, Non-Lin) change according to the shape assigned
to the distributions of the fundamental input parameters. The most interesting result of the table
is given in the further left column, where, when going from the uniform case, U, to the non-
uniform one, NU, in the linear model, we observe that the value of PF varies by one order of
magnitude. This result provides further validation for Observation III. Note that, once again,
these results are sensitive to the number of trials M.
Along the same lines of the previous analysis, but adding a layer of complexity to the
study, the case of a system with two possible failure components (as before, Linear and Non-
Linear) is considered. Each of these components now has two different failure criteria which, as
shown in Figure 20, are merely deterministic.
Table 17: Total PF for a two component system. Linear versus non-Linear for two different input sets and seeds.
M 20 10000
Lin-Non Lin U-U U-NU NU-NU NU-U U-U U-NU NU-NU NU-U
Seed
1234 4.00E-01 4.00E-01 2.00E-01 2.00E-01 4.82E-01 3.40E-01 9.20E-02 2.34E-01
2355 4.00E-01 3.50E-01 5.00E-02 1.00E-01 4.90E-01 3.40E-01 8.46E-02 2.34E-01
4567 4.00E-01 4.50E-01 3.00E-01 2.50E-01 4.79E-01 3.35E-01 8.50E-02 2.29E-01
9811 6.00E-01 4.50E-01 1.OOE-01 2.50E-01 4.83E-01 3.36E-01 8.02E-02 2.27E-01
max 6.00E-01 4.50E-01 3.00E-01 2.50E-01 4.90E-01 3.40E-01 9.20E-02 2.34E-01
min 4.00E-01 3.50E-01 5.00E-02 1.00E-01 4.79E-01 3.35E-01 8.02E-02 2.27E-01
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Next, the final PFs of the system, along with their individual variations, is considered.
LHS sampling is then used, by sampling with different seeds, in order to take into account the
variability of the results as due to the combination proposed by the LHS algorithm. Observations
VI and VII are useful in explaining the reasoning behind this approach.
Table 17 shows the final PF as given by intersection of the failures of the two single
systems (recall that they are given by the linear and the non-linear models) minus the correlated
failures (this aspect will be explained in detail with Observation VI). Due to the complexity of
the table, the focus is to be given to its furthest left part, referred to 20 simulations and then
extended and compared with the previous results. The purpose of this calculation is to show that
by changing the shape of the initial distributions and the seed of the LHS algorithm, the
variability of the measure on probability of failure of the overall system increases along all cases
considered. The measure of such variability is given in the lowest part of the table where the
maximum and minimum values for all the cases are reported: it can be seen that PF varies from
4.5E-01 to 5E-02 amongst all the four possible combinations considered and within the different
values of PF provided by LHS. This result validates Observations III and V by, once again,
showing that the variability of the measured PF changes as a function of the hypotheses done on
the mathematical model of the world used, on the shape of the initial distributions and also on the
criteria used to determine PF. This last observation refers to the multiple criterion used to the
define the overall PF: as can be seen by comparing Table 17 with Table 16, the range for the
final PF changes and it is amplified by passing from a single to a multiple criteria. This means
that small ranges of variability for a single component or system could manifest in wider ranges
of variability affecting the overall system. So special care should be taken when studying
problems which involve multiple failure criteria. Note finally that, once again, all these
considerations are a function of M as given by extending these considerations to the remaining
part of the tables illustrated here.
The next two following observations are used to provide further reasons of the choices
behind this second experiment. Specifically, they clarify the motivations of the use of different
seeds and of multiple failure criteria.
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Observation VI: All of the observations made up to this point refer to the case of a single
system with a single failure criterion. The probability of failure, PF, as defined by Equation 25,
is in fact an expression of the unreliability of the single system/structure/component/
phenomenon, SSCP, measured in the plant and thus obtained from the assumption of there being
a unique mode leading to failure. As shown in Figure 28, multiple failure criteria should be used
whenever more than one output parameter is instrumental in leading the system to failure.
Similarly, single components could fail in more than one mode, each of which associated with
different failure criteria. Various failure modes and multiple failures could occur simultaneously
or sequentially in a complex plant. This could be simulated by studying the intersection of all the
binary responses of the LHS database returning a value of 1. This procedure allows
automatically preventing the double counting of those failures which are correlated.
Figure 28: Schematic of the GFR showing the plant subjected to multiple failures.
Let Fi be the failure vectors associated to N, failure modes over M realizations. Then, the
mean probability of multiple failures is defined as:
84 P age
Then, the mean probability of multiple failures is defined as:
EF - CorrF
PFM - i M= = max(F
, 
F2, F,,...
, 
Fs) , Eq. 26
CorrF = numberofcorrelatedfailures
where, a correlated failure is a failure which is common and simultaneous to two, or
more, systems of the same plant. This means that one way of obtaining the plant's failure
probability, PFM, is to calculate the probability of failure of each individual component through
the definition provided by Equation 25, then sum all the obtained values and finally subtract the
probabilities which are derived from their correlated failures.
Observation VII: being Y a general simulation estimate, conditioning Y on the (n!)k
equally likely sequences for the k input values, it follows that:
Var(Y)= crQ + "-  Eq. 27
where the first term accounts for the variance component of Y due to sequence variability, while
the second term reflects the remaining variance component of Y as due to the set variability
conditioned on the (n!)k sequences. Using LHS, the residual term a-2 will be of the order of
o(n-"), with a > 2, while no matter the sampling methods r2EQ iS always of the order of o(n-1).
This implies that, for LHS, the second term will decrease faster than the first, so that for a high
number of trials the only variability in LHS will be given by the left part of the equation, thus
from the sequence variability intrinsic to the algorithm [E. Saliby, 1997]. This variability, which
represents the unavoidable part of variance imputable to the different values obtainable by
sampling from the same set of parameters but with different seeds, can be attained by sampling
different sets of simulations, each of size M, with a different initial seed; by changing the seed,
for a low M, the variability of the output Y, which for our purposes is given by PF, can be shown.
Thus, if, for example, computational limitations are present, it would be nonetheless possible to
measure the uncertainty of PF by sampling four sets of 32 trials each, instead of one single set of
128 trials. With approximately the same computational time it would also be possible to gather
information about the uncertainty on the measure of PF. These last two observations lead to a
reformulation of PF.
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Reformulation of the Probability of Failure
Based on the results yielded by these numerical examples, a revision of the formulation
of PF, as given in the equation provided at the beginning of this exercise, is necessary. This
reformulation originates from the need to provide a measure of the uncertainty affecting PF in
problems where the computational time represents a limit for the observations. Through this
operation, it should be possible to obtain a measure of the variance of PF, and therefore monitor
it, for a low number of realizations M. The formulation can be naturally extended to the
definition of an overall failure probability of the plant, PFM.
The A; variable is still 1 or 0 as it was defined in Equation 25 but the PFs are now given
by the sum of the Ai's weighted by the number of times they appear in a defined set of N runs
with M samples each. Therefore, the probability of there being a failure in the system is averaged
with the values coming from a set of N equi-probable multi-seeds realizations:
M
1N JAPF,'= -- (' ' )j Eq. 28N M
The probability of failure of the system, is now averaged by the number of runs, N, and it
expresses the mean value over them. This definition has a general connotation and thus is to be
considered valid regardless of the assumptions made by the specific sampling method (in this
case Latin Hypercube). Furthermore it expresses the random uncertainties that characterize the
output parameter PF. The variance on the output PF can be similarly obtained as:
Var(PF)= [PF -( ,]2 -N Eq.29
N j=1 M N j=1
M
where Nf = PFs and Nfj = (- A, /M)j Eq. 30
i=1
This final definition concludes the observations about the LHS method and the variables
involved in the determination of its accuracy. It emerged clearly that the number of trials M
remains a critical variable for the determination of PF. To conclude this aspect, the next Section
investigates the consequences of different Mon the response of the classification techniques.
861 Page
Prediction via Classification Techniques: the Patterns of the Failures
One way to reduce the uncertainty in the output, and therefore to save computational
time, is to predict the failure via classification techniques. Figure 30 and Figure 31 show the
scatter-plots derived from Example I for different sampling sizes (the number of realizations, M,
changes from one plot to the other); it can be seen how, as the number of realizations increases,
the number of failures around the threshold line accumulates. The scatter plot progresses from
two single random failures for M equal to 60, to a scattered straight line for M equal to 400, till
finally forming a band for the two cases of M equal to 2000 and Mequal to 10,000.
Classification Agreement s as function of Trials M
100.00% -
* 90.00% -2 80.00% -
, 70.00% -4 60.00%
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S40.00% ---
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400 2000 10000
I LR 0 99.50% 99.80% 99,90%
I CTO 100.00% i 99.90% 99.90%
n LR 1 100.00% 92.00% 98.50%
SCT 1 50.00% 88.00% 96.20%
Figure 29: Agreement in prediction as a function of the number of trials.
The results provided by the two different algorithms, CT and LR are satisfactory in the
three cases analyzed here: Figure 29 shows that the LR maintains an overall 99%, or better,
capability to predict the data, this means that even the case with lowest number of failures (for
M=400 the total number of failures is just 13 and only 4 of them are used in the validation
dataset) presents no misclassifications. On the other hand, the CT at M=400 predicts correctly
just half of the failures in the dataset, so, for this case, 2 failures.
Table 18: CT thresholds for HTC Core and Summary p-tests for LC
HTC measures 400 2000 10,000
Thresholds 148.11 162.93 148.66 157.27 154.27 156.9
Pr(I t) 1.OOE-03 6.06E-08 1.17E-32
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The thresholds, granted by CT, thus provide precise threshold values for the only
significant parameter 'HTC core' for the last two cases of Table 18 where a dramatic increase in
its p-test value, is shown. This decrease in significance is due to the "poorness" of the first
dataset. Note that it is the low numbers of failures, as opposed to the total number of realizations,
to determine the inefficacy in predictions. Figure 30 shows an extreme case for this by reporting
the number of failures obtained by the first 60 realizations. The number of failures is in this case
2, which means that the classifier would have a training set of, at most, I failure.
Note that 2 over 60 yields a probability equal to 2.33E-02 which is quite close to the
asymptotic value of 3.0E-02 which has been reported in Figure 25 and obtained from 10,000
simulations. This outcome can be interpreted by saying that, despite the apparent low numerical
difference between 2.33E-02 and 3.0E-02, the uncertainty related to the patterns of PF is actually
significant as illustrated by comparing the last scatter-plot of Figure 31 with the one of Figure
30.
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Figure 30: Scatter-plot of the failures in the core for a number of samplings M = 60.
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Figure 31: Scatter-plots of response and failures as a function of the Number of Realizations M. GFR's core Model
(Example I) for 400, 2000 and 10,000 realizations.
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The same analysis has been carried out using the dataset of Example II. In this case the
upper value for the number of possible samplings is now set to 128. Figure 32 shows the scatter-
plots next to the tree structure. The interesting finding here is given by the 'Max Leakage'
threshold line which, in order to capture as many failures as possible, translates to the right of the
graph, as M increases. This behavior confirms the capability of supervised methods to confine
the dependent variable into clustered regions even for the case of relative low values of
samplings (and consequently for low number of failures).
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Figure 32: Scatter-plots of response and failures as a function of the Number of Realizations M. GFR's core Model
(Example II). Threshold lines are indicated in the graphs.
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Findings
Through the third example we presented a purely mathematical model in order to explore
the implications of an uncertain PF output, as emerged from Examples I and II. We decomposed
this problem by stating that these uncertainties could depend on different factors, and the seven
observations are the result of this discretization. What is inferred from the above seven
considerations is that:
* The value of the output of a given system is affected by uncertainty, the same then is for PF;
* This uncertainty is nonetheless small if the number of samples is high enough;
* If the number of samples is sufficiently high, the issue is non relevant;
* If the number of simulations is limited by - as is the case for Example II - computational time
constraints, there is a chance that this small uncertainty can amplify, as in the case of multiple
system failures and multiple failure modes.
Once again the critical parameter, amongst the many determined, is the number of
simulations available, M.
Since the most common scenario is that of a small number of available simulations, this
exercise also explains the need to monitor the PF uncertainty through a set of simulations with a
different number of seeds. By doing so, an estimate of the PF, even when its asymptotical value
is unknown, could be obtained.
At the same time, the capability of the model to predict the system's probability of failure
was proven to be greatly influenced by the number of simulations M:
The scatter plots provide for a visual understanding of these considerations, by showing
that the points, associated with the failure events, are uncertain in position, and that the patterns
followed by these failures remain undetermined by changing their boundaries.
Further studies should explore the connection between these two last factors, the
uncertainty of the PF, and the unspecified patterns followed by the failures.
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4. FINAL REMARKS AND CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this work was to define a correct methodology that would determine the
reliability of Passive Systems. Specifically, the method proposed here concentrated on the study
of those fundamental parameters that are most significant in leading the system to failure.
The issue of correctly assessing these fundamental quantities is not trivial. Concurrently
to the appropriate selection of the parameters, this work studied to define a hierarchy among
them. For this purpose, it is crucial to properly rank and prioritize the different components, or
modules, of the system that fail as a consequence of those parameters. The method aims to
discover the possible combinations of the latter that would result in a system failure.
The methodology described in this work was designed to be computationally swift and
easy to understand and apply, all the while being mathematically robust. A statistical approach
fulfilled these requirements, and the tools selected were that of the Classification Tree and
Logistic Regression. An effort was made to validate each step by means of visual verification
combined with more classification analysis, including the tools mentioned, p-tests and Wald
Statistics. The method was applied to systems undergoing transient conditions so that failures of
the system could be simultaneously and immediately detectable.
In order to gauge the efficacy of the method, 3 examples were developed, each one with a
specific purpose in mind.
Example I was designed to be purely illustrative of the method: an unlikely failure of the
core was conveniently simulated by means of a systems dynamics model.
Example II studied a more likely scenario, by taking into account the model of full plant
in order to better study the propagation of failures from one system to the next.
With the purpose of containing the already intense computational time involved in these
models, only one failure criterion was used (T cladding for the first Example and T structural
collapse of the ECCS Pipe for the second).
Example III was a consequence of the results obtained by these analyses.
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It appeared in fact, that while the first Example yielded a 99% agreement between the
output predicted by the method and that of the model, the results of second Example were a bit
more difficult to interpret, since the number of simulations available was low (128).
Examples I and II differed, asides from in the complexity of their models, also in the
number of simulations available, M, for each. This difference in M was non-trivial: 10,000 for
the first, and 128 for the second. It became significant to understand whether there was a relation
between M and the uncertainty of the output PF.
Where Example I succeeded in validating the method proposed, Example II proved that
the low number of simulations hindered the capacity to correctly predict PF.
Example III was developed to analyze this issue, and thus purely mathematical, with no
apparent physical connotation. This test was critical since it also considered the possibility, not
present in the first two examples, of multiple failures combined with multiple failure modes. The
problem was approached by creating two distinct models, one linear and one non-linear, coherent
with the topology of the previous examples. The outputs of these 2 models were then analyzed
based on the number of simulations to which the two systems where subjected.
The outcome of this analysis was that the output did in fact vary depending on the
number of simulations available. Furthermore, it became apparent that for a low M, other factors
became increasingly significant in determining the uncertainty of the PF. These factors are the
shape and distribution of the input parameters, their seed number, the sampling criterion used to
select values for the input (in this case: LHS), the type of model used to simulate their behavior
and a combination of one or more of the above.
This result was achieved, among other means, by that of the visual study of the scatter
plots yielded by the analysis. These showed that those points, associated with failure events,
were uncertain in position and presented no determinate pattern when Mwas low.
The work conducted highlights the importance of the number of simulations when
predicting that probability of failure of a system. Furthermore, since the most common scenario
is that of a low number of trial runs, it calls for further studies into the connection between the
uncertainty of the PF and the unspecified patterns followed in the scatter plots.
93 P age
5. RISK-INFORMED REGULATIONS
The initial objective of this work was to improve the current state of risk-informed
regulations. The present study supported this original goal in two ways:
First, in a practical sense, by increasing the body of cases available in the literature of
applications of load-capacity studies in the nuclear field. This means that this study succeeded in
providing a direct contribution to the need of having a systematic approach to the proper analysis
of uncertainties' propagation.
Secondly, by combining practical and numerical methods in order to provide further
insights when applying risk-informed regulations. What is meant by this, is that the statistical
method used throughout this study, was aimed at improving the current approach and problem
solving algorithms exercised in this type of problems.
The accuracy of the prediction methods was enhanced by the study of the relevance of
the available simulations, M. The confidence statement concerning the applicability of a given
number of simulations, usually set at 128, was debated through a methodology that was further
supported by three fundamental examples. In this case, a systematic way to include uncertainties
in the models, or codes, representing the plant's "model of the world" was approached both,
from the performance and from the acceptance criteria points of view. The analysis performed on
the numerical implementation of those procedures connecting these models to the simulator,
could lead to further significant improvements to the present-day risk-informed regulations.
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6. FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS
In the development of future works some of the aspects not covered here could be
addressed. The following list summarizes those aspects that were left aside and in the author's
opinion would deserve further attention.
1. The specific role played in the prediction models by the results obtained through p-value
testing, should be looked into more closely; the p-value technique was availed as a criterion to
evaluate the statistical significance of the parameters, yet the use of the 0.05 value, provided by
the chi square, has to be substantiated.
2. The effects generated by the presence of non-linearities in the model of the world.
3. Check the validity of other supervised learning techniques, especially when it comes to
problems with multiple outputs. This issue was addressed earlier in this work while explaining
LHS, and when discussing the approach used in Example III. In other words, while in the first
two examples the input dataset was monitored for the case of just one output variable (the
probability of failure of a single system), in Example III the problem went from being simply 2-
Dimensional to becoming N-Dimensional. This increase in complexity implicates the loss of
relevance of the scatter-plots, thus other methods, such as cluster analyses, could be used in order
to verify the failures. Another approach to this problem could be to perform a principal
component analysis in order to assess the variance of the parameters. These two possible
solutions have the advantage being always applicable, even when no prior knowledge of the
model is available.
4. Test the methodology with an enhanced model of the whole plant developed with a high-
level software (GoldsSim® instead of Vensim®) capable of tolerating the use of deterministic and
probabilistic variables for a high number of variables and/or for a high number of simulations,
M. GoldsSim® has the distinct advantage of providing specific tools such as containment
transport and reliability modules. These in particular, facilitate the development of complex
engineering designs. The model is under development and it is named GFRDYN_LUMPED_5N.
Its code was conceived to be capable of considering the interface between the Passive System,
the containment, and the core. The motivation to present a final model, complete of all the
features discussed throughout the 3 examples, is to present more credible results to risk-informed
regulations by providing a more realistic and comprehensive scenario.
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8. APPENDICES
8.1 Appendix A: Sub-Model of the GFR's Core used for Example I
The following algorithm was modeled by means of Vensim 5.4 by Ventana@ Systems.
SYSTEM:
CORE, ECCS, HXC
Plant's Systems
.Overall Heat Transfer Core
Fuel Resistivity=
((1-(Internal Radius Channel RF1/Inner Cladding Radius Rci)A2)/4-LN(Inner
Cladding Radius Rci\
/Internal Radius Channel RF1
)/2)/(2*3.14*Fuel Conductivity Kf)
S m*K/(J/sec)
Active Length core=
1.54
i m/channel
Gas Channel Resistivity=
1/(Area Active Core*Htc Core)
K/(J/s)
Average Radius Gap=
4.2/1000+70/1 e+006/2
m
Cladding Conductivity Kc=
20
~ J/(m*s*K)
Cladding Resistivity=
LN(Outer Cladding Radius Rco/Inner Cladding Radius Rci)/(2*3.14*Cladding
Conductivity Kc)
- m*K/(J/sec)
991 P age
Equivalent Diameter =
0.006983
m
External Equivalent Channel Diameter=
6.983/1000
m
Fuel Conductivity Kf=
3.7
J/(m*s*K)
Gap Resistivity=
1/(2*3.14*Average Radius Gap*Heat transfer Coeff Gap)
m*K/(J/sec)
Gap Thickness =
70/1 e+006
m
Internal Radius Channel RF1=
4.2/1000+70/1e+006
m
Gas Conductivity Kgap=
0.08
J/(m*s*K)
Heat transfer Coeff Gap=
Gas Conductivity Kgap/Gap Thickness
J/s/(m*m*K)
Outer Cladding Radius Rco =
4.2/1000
m
Inner Cladding Radius Rci=
Equivalent Diameter/2
m
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Number of Channels=
100170
- channels
Lumped Core's Length=
Active Length
m
core*Number of Channels
Overall Heat Transfer Coefficient=
1/(Cladding Resistivity/Lumped Core's Length+Fuel Resistivity/Lumped Core's
Length+Gap Resistivity/Lumped Core's Length+Gas Channel Resistivity)
J/(s*K)
Htc Core=
100
- J/s/(K*m*m)
Area Active Core=
1260
- m*m
.Validity Test Indexes
Heat Pulse =
Amplitude Pulse *pulse( 1000,1000)
MJ/sec
switch Pulse =
0
S Dmnl
1= no pulse ; 0= pulse in heat
Amplitude Pulse=
130
101 I P a ge
.Failure Model
Failure Counter Cladding=
IF THEN ELSE(T Cladding>=T Limit Cladding, 1 , 0)
Dmnl
Time Coefficient Cladding=
1
S 1/s
Time of residence in a failure state Cladding=
IF THEN ELSE(Time=FINAL TIME, T Counter Cladding , 0 )
Dmnl
T Counter Cladding= INTEG (
Failure Counter
0)
Dmnl
T Limit Cladding=
1200+273.16
K
Cladding*Time Coefficient Cladding,
Failure Counter =
IF THEN ELSE(Tmax Fuel>=T Fuel Limit, 1 , 0)
Dmnl
T core Counter= INTEG (
Failure Counter*Time Coefficient,
0)
Dmnl
Peaking Factor=
1.3*1.15
Dmnl
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Tmax Fuel=
T Core*Peaking Factor
K
T Fuel Limit =
2200+273.16
K
Time of residence in a failure state=
IF THEN ELSE(Time=FINAL TIME, T core Counter, 0 )
Dmnl
"J/MJ Converter"=
1 e+006
J/MJ
.Initial Values
Gas Mass flow Rate 0=
300
S kg/s
Q Gas Core 0=
Mass Gas Core*Cp Gas*T gas Core 0/"J/MJ Converter"
MJ
Q Core 0=
Mass Core*Cp Core*T core 0/"J/MJ Converter"
SMJ
T core 0=
600
K
T gas Core 0=
+400
~ K
Q Extracted from Core 0=
103 I P a ge
0
SMJ
INITIAL TIME = 550
SSecond
The initial time for the simulation.
.Model Variables
Q gas transfer rate=
IF THEN ELSE(switch Pulse=l, Overall Heat Transfer
Core)/"J/MJ Converter", Overall Heat Transfer Coefficient*(T
Converter"-Heat Pulse)
MJ/sec
Coefficient*(T Core-T gas
Core-T gas Core)/"J/MJ
Tin Core =
400
K
Tout Core=
2*T gas Core- Tin Core
K
T Cladding=
T Core+Q gas transfer rate/(1/(Cladding Resistivity/Lumped Core's Length+Fuel
Resistivity/Lumped Core's Length+Gap Resistivity/Lumped Core's Length))*"J/MJ Converter"
~ K
Q decay rate=
a*Power Th*(Time+ 1 e-006)A(-b)
S MJ/sec
Q core extraction rate=
Gas Mass flow Rate
MJ/sec
"deltaTcore=Tout-Tin"=
Tout Core-Tin Core
K
0*Cp Gas*"deltaTcore=Tout-Tin"/"J/MJ Converter"
T Core=
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Q Core*"J/MJ Converter"/(Cp Core*Mass Core)
K
T gas Core=
Q Gas Core*"J/MJ Converter"/(Cp Gas*Mass Gas Core)
K
.Parameters
SS~tS ~ SSSSSSSSSS$$$$$$$$$$$$$$I
Volume Tot=
Cp Core=
Cp Gas=
Mass Core=
70000
536
0.173
0.28
1180.5
115942
mm*m*m
J/(K*kg)
Dmnl
Dmnl
J/(K*kg)
kg
Mass Gas Core=
36000
S kg
Power Th=
2400
105 I P a ge
MJ/sec
.Level Variables
Q Extracted from Core= INTEG (
Q core extraction rate,
Q Extracted from Core 0)
MJ
Q Core= INTEG (
Q decay rate-Q gas transfer rate,
Q Core 0)
MJ
Q Gas Core = INTEG (
+Q gas transfer rate-Q core extraction rate,
Q Gas Core 0)
MJ
.Unit Converters
Time Coefficient=
1
1/s
.Control: Simulation Control Parameters
FINAL TIME = 10000
Second
The final time for the simulation.
SAVEPER = TIME STEP
Second [0,?]
The frequency with which output is stored.
TIME STEP = 1
Second [0,?]
The time step for the simulation.
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8.2 Appendix B: Dataset from RELAP5-3D used for Example II
The following
MacKay, 2007].
dataset was created by Francisco Mackay and can be found in [F.
Roughness Heat Transfer Heat TransferValve 674 Valve 665 Shaft MomentCoefficient in Coefficient in
In the core Containment Core
1 7.0266E-05 0.660972906 0.132791381 1.018099269 0.175240146 756.4283936
2 3.17861E-05 0.464606103 0.009216567 0.619031756 1.49147449 908.4799804
3 1.41968E-05 0.189936412 0.446353642 0.518304501 4.089563936 805.6640345
4 0.000165969 0.2247406 1.665210385 3.074084819 1.339039701 774.7889025
5 2.23325E-05 0.110839306 0.363779265 3.883312254 0.543303791 679.3242198
6 8.95976E-05 0.082665107 0.273528511 0.094501105 0.936337946 546.7819977
7 2.53847E-05 0.392584938 0.085119427 1.183833099 0.646817192 653.69233
8 4.4716E-05 0.032207799 0.215695098 1.643178094 0.376749072 723.5864463
9 5.38544E-05 0.607582295 0.156639456 1.772914465 1.793946565 597.3626375
10 7.85191 E-05 0.302996778 0.042048843 0.277030229 2.391928364 732.6888426
11 3.85214E-05 0.17446045 0.09064391 4.829592916 0.293658031 703.6532569
12 8.47645E-06 0.140217132 0.220896755 0.42291142 0.864267335 759.3058686
13 5.91768E-05 0.058180793 0.70785134 0.838450117 0.465954267 696.1311388
14 2.84935E-05 0.012386872 0.534292341 2.266994934 1.104884296 823.2713509
15 1.82596E-05 0.337699928 0.348002328 0.745117621 0.761977965 846.9083615
16 0.000123131 0.890796357 0.023758162 1.333115501 0.429398495 633.8352274
17 7.08761E-06 0.066021338 0.127291225 11.24755112 1.596157589 841.0356824
18 1.10777E-05 0.099241677 0.061949683 1.369543295 1.013147351 770.1586118
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19 0.000105528 0.529594859 0.189806486 0.948642402 0.727023454 749.8937713
20 4.31121E-05 0.74219072 0.114714985 3.263201796 1.224111492 890.9974519
21 0.000211663 0.03001568 0.069037775 0.210871326 0.676329216 739.7666992
22 1.92448E-05 0.202227439 0.985357812 0.905538264 1.170526951 644.3272329
23 3.40267E-05 0.263548363 0.178068757 0.803267482 3.684155094 626.2864629
24 4.96232E-05 0.498487678 0.238331675 0.468322129 0.095135605 720.8448245
25 0.00014868 0.043266545 0.286472444 2.184673244 0.802686297 807.6559167
26 1.71049E-05 1.190170101 0.512037361 1.487914895 0.242057146 693.869699
27 5.68576E-05 0.001891644 0.593915737 1.121569675 0.409672324 663.102377
28 2.34316E-05 0.422684746 0.321484425 0.347961093 2.105991987 795.8641541
29 3.63424E-05 0.127905542 0.852944013 0.689984288 0.511600116 712.7091911
30 6.49453E-05 0.256755913 0.422403824 2.608512339 0.328936234 684.2025295
31 8.00589E-05 0.158081862 0.017396258 1.921065859 0.574820132 782.6452305
32 2.91641E-05 0.330425174 0.039769783 0.542943227 1.919305918 589.7391975
33 4.68492E-05 0.641145484 0.678139931 0.770016585 0.25968491 812.7976894
34 9.93625E-05 0.80248295 0.911992663 1.061765697 2.910536583 675.4663903
35 8.51434E-05 0.154193833 0.30223248 1.397918526 0.889602906 659.5673134
36 5.12343E-05 0.084045934 0.333844337 0.303841247 0.792966876 825.8242815
37 7.10865E-05 0.480768573 1.230679167 1.908661706 1.247906264 735.2691428
38 0.000111937 0.23343891 0.163818188 0.811362806 0.152467084 766.0256004
39 2.0305E-05 0.136108256 0.490839118 1.721271504 0.397270165 691.1926356
40 9.97261E-06 0.994760314 0.561209485 2.350701033 0.999122583 680.3988408
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41 2.17877E-05 0.187909689 0.24745941 3.571845903 0.4874615 698.6515597
42 1.48581E-05 0.244850439 0.183940052 1.239715178 1.684962153 834.5824853
43 4.71902E-05 0.282812486 0.202202188 0.358308616 2.057624559 744.2958614
44 3.09792E-05 0.403472191 0.793651269 6.032402101 0.698321791 753.7330773
45 7.38153E-05 0.060647096 0.629844302 0.71082589 0.956883392 727.6012104
46 0.00020055 0.071397709 0.082152443 2.507926869 1.142414957 919.8463003
47 2.77006E-05 0.104256214 0.153300021 5.406115063 8.141160654 717.6353089
48 3.98161 E-05 0.700051648 0.001308486 0.884653856 1.560774312 568.5798634
49 4.62055E-06 0.315619703 0.383399114 1.591284501 0.631478997 649.990263
50 1.61458E-05 0.00693723 0.46147984 1.291044363 2.286157212 620.3083227
51 6.56956E-05 0.17005815 0.231037463 1.54223527 1.041974271 614.5442327
52 6.14829E-05 0.018504666 0.012842897 4.001604887 0.361890083 787.9536835
53 2.61785E-05 0.022433357 0.316280157 0.660842505 0.344565861 764.3418628
54 0.000267854 1.442496364 0.054688522 0.394960618 0.276108579 506.9498172
55 1.24528E-05 0.361764165 0.118231636 0.250464186 0.831776376 709.2587003
56 0.000133637 0.117707471 0.100020368 0.575748717 0.455933376 798.5982391
57 2.46989E-05 0.094621349 0.03588993 2.021533534 1.386404602 640.4817296
58 5.5652E-05 0.049276257 0.258345944 0.605107028 0.212640618 670.8181273
59 1.74366E-05 0.449463712 0.142381726 1.115250099 0.524400738 792.6038844
60 3.79521E-05 0.038705296 0.075183345 0.181204116 0.560520061 740.1853296
61 9.74176E-05 0.272326653 0.106640922 0.484303178 2.635348042 857.0121359
62 4.16683E-05 0.210614439 0.051236791 0.997587303 0.70547236 870.6038543
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63 3.56232E-05 0.574585443 0.406903451 2.757981398 0.608032193 776.9877291
64 3.30958E-05 0.374395138 0.028567636 0.443542793 1.406811368 714.4770836
65 2.44393E-05 0.03892315 0.037643374 1.826227042 0.743613759 790.4907116
66 3.26663E-05 0.429736516 0.073220858 2.374057349 0.66304439 762.5381162
67 0.000119456 0.853064915 0.110295296 2.700746814 0.350313969 697.3852592
68 4.24467E-05 0.163285009 0.057242128 0.163381672 0.44344617 667.9643603
69 6.11709E-05 0.182661765 0.194803481 0.323280366 0.289654677 819.3971924
70 1.44549E-05 0.177547568 0.031614643 1.255017446 0.4822816 754.0690469
71 3.96156E-05 0.294931273 0.663103609 0.515879692 0.118911905 810.9794981
72 1.63018E-05 0.292796158 0.396770153 4.520676725 0.756463197 605.3773675
73 9.44872E-05 0.05127336 0.294894594 1.217860942 3.045780555 881.102285
74 1.35938E-05 0.562509747 0.095951235 1.060178579 2.559356379 786.2160539
75 1.56751E-05 0.069275548 0.327920832 2.203124185 0.336998293 750.443934
76 9.2457E-05 0.220260843 0.264218317 0.386888355 0.92479469 771.8319671
77 3.50952E-05 0.321362252 1.155321411 0.787872797 1.950232297 773.9635894
78 5.46275E-05 0.089781232 0.160602313 1.744233057 0.903230525 667.0187805
79 4.80789E-05 0.21184961 0.357060873 1.430553609 0.62257917 726.377878
80 1.19785E-05 0.348104379 0.060423816 1.51025574 1.281580227 901.8600227
81 2.29841E-05 0.078958706 0.066758276 0.921965926 0.549252891 689.3581492
82 5.76447E-05 0.109910569 0.207762362 0.234382257 0.418804468 542.6183457
83 4.8909E-05 0.312370023 0.477193119 2.429644306 0.588941377 779.4032731
84 4.05737E-05 0.387344337 0.828494585 1.564471368 1.629139496 566.0462942
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85 9.09296E-06 0.015774464 0.138237619 1.312702309 1.306318855 780.6770487
86 7.22034E-05 0.491041341 0.006652834 1.360475912 0.870487068 646.5550358
87 7.62102E-05 0.405617924 0.018203018 1.464275245 0.217787688 631.2502285
88 8.1427E-06 0.198004657 0.341567074 0.218745727 1.350890534 829.7959148
89 6.33097E-05 1.066584672 0.393328526 3.731597047 1.756550384 736.7537934
90 1.07823E-05 0.063723513 1.027471598 1.087912879 0.600179238 618.2618736
91 3.42523E-05 0.026950605 0.281080473 2.933790801 1.542390549 661.3841643
92 3.00196E-05 0.238012053 0.143020405 0.639826242 1.131315686 723.0224825
93 0.000129871 0.124871384 1.416088806 0.328154832 0.252036602 607.7127042
94 0.000154807 1.640795395 0.174494136 0.698446807 1.458026427 687.2560797
95 5.83034E-05 0.114459764 0.548945478 4.244041273 0.30499423 691.5167995
96 2.08798E-05 0.054269715 0.049615326 0.969358208 0.158179792 745.988633
97 4.6118E-05 0.046090401 0.72803977 0.431048625 0.228051476 719.5882072
98 3.19744E-05 0.123509661 0.378526192 5.066997272 1.194993691 730.2204229
99 0.000109476 0.091293959 0.202069973 0.28116126 2.718226393 828.5424988
100 0.000101622 0.162009876 0.021353242 1.178274754 2.191621088 866.6712278
101 0.000117389 0.197024004 0.089317371 0.632726739 1.862677253 682.3440286
102 1.81686E-05 1.116133243 0.631878624 0.50362288 0.476034599 706.2820555
103 0.000140123 0.3694106 0.123210426 2.116812651 3.350699786 676.6710866
104 2.35482E-05 0.231032974 0.045327924 3.093001052 0.437834921 700.4461747
105 0.000184661 0.00341441 0.011420538 1.036389138 0.951400214 800.1570805
106 0.000350929 0.007558315 0.752383237 2.849447745 1.031748519 840.016604
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107 3.66486E-05 0.034792339 0.148018768 1.838354829 1.068334272 704.8611658
108 5.27417E-05 0.267794393 0.166937809 0.722632293 2.239221847 742.5520429
109 2.72498E-05 0.438173699 0.310950321 1.687224992 0.528280225 652.8748077
110 8.64598E-05 0.689489885 0.078987467 0.414106752 0.846720021 638.5343373
111 5.76494E-06 0.720264048 0.567437747 0.954076081 0.388809242 710.7008624
112 2.59569E-05 0.45873879 0.500676834 2.066317956 0.777648147 578.8421024
113 2.89684E-05 0.076801692 0.288628703 3.448935736 0.49654075 803.3525057
114 1.87046E-05 0.014315049 0.432706689 7.888527292 0.653884589 767.0671491
115 2.68496E-05 0.589125745 0.003257401 0.567182096 0.689344201 758.0042827
116 5.1259E-05 0.144203165 0.610120945 0.756656021 0.972753315 862.1368141
117 8.27308E-05 0.622005761 0.252690176 0.893303892 4.6458655 793.8374791
118 3.06792E-05 0.544848006 0.105402894 0.371657756 0.823148669 595.2374457
119 0.000242648 0.100470863 0.232242065 0.463772479 0.372780363 952.8508248
120 2.12095E-05 0.771453316 0.245206874 0.555995609 0.312550768 729.8084907
121 3.77208E-05 0.147013488 0.890147715 0.135454779 1.435246354 627.4004514
122 6.81034E-05 0.248773951 0.027479927 0.86335716 1.078165163 672.4727793
123 4.45943E-05 0.511529166 0.466634545 1.983037627 5.38763593 851.0149522
124 1.27816E-05 0.951530839 0.098224977 0.831457732 1.197266703 747.4191242
125 7.78064E-05 0.132872215 0.221597428 0.675599703 0.566604491 733.6726776
126 6.6777E-05 0.022776219 0.188431304 7.610320216 0.717407639 714.6749388
127 1.97961 E-05 0.34663953 0.433029247 1.158006383 1.743479501 816.8852588
128 4.36691E-05 0.276821361 0.131480541 0.594252985 0.197257333 656.443749
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6.3 Appendix C: XML script from Insightful Miner used for Example II and III
The following XLM script was written with Insightful Miner by Insightful
Corporation®.
<?xml version="l.0" encoding="UTF-8" ?>
- <IMML version="7.0">
- <Worksheet lastNodeID="26" linkType="diagonal">
- <FileInfo>
<FileAuthor>Edo</FileAuthor>
<FileName>C:\Documents and
Settings\Edo\Desktop\3paraml 0000\threeParCoreModel.imw</FileName>
<FileDateCreated> 1179601921171 </FileDateCreated>
</Filelnfo>
- <WorksheetProperties>
- <XTProps>
<Property name="maxStringSize" value="33" />
<Property name="maxCategoricalLevels" value="500" />
<Property name="numDigits" value="2" />
<Property name=" stringL eftAlign" value="false" />
<Property name="dateParseString" value="%m[/][.]%d[/][,]%y [%H[:%M[:%S[.%N]]]] [%p]" />
<Property name="dateFormatString" value="%02m/%02d/%Y %02H:%02M:%02S" />
<Property name="dateCenturyCutoff' value=" 1950" />
<Property name="decimalSymbols" value=".," / >
<Property name="maxBufferMB" value=" 10" />
<Property name="rowsToChunk" value="10000" />
<Property name="useCache" value="yes" />
</XTProps>
</WorksheetProperties>
- <WorksheetParameters>
<XTProps />
</WorksheetParameters>
- <ComponentComments>
- <AuthorComments>
<AuthorName>Edo</AuthorName>
<AuthorCommentTitle>Not Provided</AuthorCommentTitle>
<AuthorCommentDateCreated>May 19, 2007</AuthorCommentDateCreated>
<AuthorCommentText>Not Provided</AuthorCommentText>
</AuthorComments>
- <DiscussionComments>
- <Comment>
<CommentAuthor>Not Provided</CommentAuthor>
<CommentDateCreated>Not Provided</CommentDateCreated>
<CommentTitle>Not Provided</CommentTitle>
<CommentText>Not Provided</CommentText>
</Comment>
</DiscussionComments>
</ComponentComments>
- <ActivityNodeList>
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- <ActivityNode engineClass="com.insightful.miner.ReadExcelFileEngineNode"
guiClass="com.insightful.miner.ReadExcelFileNodeModel" numlnputs="O" numOutputs="l"
id=,"O">
<DisplayInfo labelText="Read Dataset" defaultLabelText="Read Excel File"
smalllcon="read_excel_small.gif' largelcon="read_excel large.gif" x="43" y="175" />
- <ArgumentList>
- <XTProps>
<Property name="useGlobal" value="true" />
<Property name="useCache" value="global" />
<Property name="filePath" value="C:\Documents and
Settings\Edo\Desktop\3param 10000\Calc_Class.xls" />
<Property name="fileType" value="EXCEL" />
<Property name="rowsToPreview" value="20" />
<Property name="startRow" value="" />
<Property name="endRow" value= "" />
<Property name="defaultStringColumnType" value="string" />
<Property name="specifiedRowsToChunk" value="O" />
<Property name="rowsToChunk" value="10000" />
<Property name="randomSeed" value="newSeedEveryTime" />
<Property name="randomSeedValue" value="5" />
<Property name="isSampleFraction" value="false" />
<Property name="isSampleEachN" value="false" />
<Property name="sampleFraction" value="0.5" />
<Property name="sampleEachN" value="2" />
<Property name="worksheet" value="dataset60" />
- <Property name="columns">
- <Property name="Number">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" />
</Property>
- <Property name="Failure Fuel">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" />
</Property>
- <Property name="Failure Clad">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" / >
<Property name="datatype" value="categorical" />
</Property>
- <Property name="Time Out Fuel">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" / >
</Property>
- <Property name="Time Out Clad">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" />
</Property>
- <Property name="Col9">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" />
</Property>
- <Property name="T CladEp Lim">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" />
</Property>
- <Property name="T Clad">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" />
</Property>
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- <Property name="SM">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" />
</Property>
- <Property name="Failure Cladding">
<Property name="datatype" value="categorical" />
</Property>
- <Property name="test">
<Property name="isSelected" value="false" />
</Property>
</Property>
</XTProps>
</ArgumentList>
- <ComponentComments>
- <AuthorComments>
<AuthorName>Edo</AuthorName>
<AuthorCommentTitle>Not Provided</AuthorCommentTitle>
<AuthorCommentDateCreated>May 19, 2007</AuthorCommentDateCreated>
<AuthorCommentText>Not Provided</AuthorCommentText>
</AuthorComments>
- <DiscussionComments>
- <Comment>
<CommentAuthor>Not Provided</CommentAuthor>
<CommentDateCreated>Not Provided</CommentDateCreated>
<CommentTitle>Not Provided</CommentTitle>
<CommentText>Not Provided</CommentText>
</Comment>
</DiscussionComments>
</ComponentComments>
</ActivityNode>
- <ActivityNode engineClass="com.insightful.miner.ClassificationRpartEngineNode"
guiClass="com.insightful.miner.ClassificationTreeNodeModel" numlnputs=" I " numOutputs=" 1"
id=" 1">
<DisplayInfo labelText="Classification Tree (1)" defaultLabelText="Classification Tree"
smalllcon="classification_tree_small.gif" largelcon="classification_tree_large.gif' x="260"
y="365" />
- <ArgumentList>
- <XTProps>
- <Property name="copylnputColumns">
<Property name="independent" value="false" />
<Property name="dependent" value="true" />
<Property name="other" value="false" />
</Property>
- <Property name="newColumns">
<Property name="probability" value="true" />
<Property name="classification" value="true" />
<Property name="agreement" value="false" />
<Property name="probabilityFor" value="forSpecifiedCategory" />
<Property name="specifiedCategory" value="l" />
</Property>
<Property name="tree.ensemble" value="true" />
<Property name="rows.per.tree" value="300" />
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<Property name="max.rows" value=" 10000" />
<Property name="useGlobal" value="false" / >
<Property name="rowsToChunk" value="300" />
<Property name="specifiedRowsToChunk" value="O" />
<Property name="useCache" value="global" />
<Property name="randomSeed" value="newSeedEveryTime" />
<Property name="randomSeedValue" value="5" />
<Property name="propertiesSet" value="true" />
<Property name="min.size" value="4" />
<Property name="min.cut" value="4" />
<Property name="split.entropy" value="true" />
<Property name="cp" value="0.0010" />
<Property name="CV.k" value="5" />
<Property name="prune.criterion" value="0" />
<Property name="n.trees" value=" 10" />
<Property name="min.dev" value="0.01" />
- <Property name="columnRoles">
<Property name="T fuel 0" value="independent" />
<Property name="Cp" value="independent" />
<Property name="HTC[Core]" value="independent" />
<Property name="Failure Cladding" value="dependent" />
</Property>
</XTProps>
</ArgumentList>
- <ComponentComments>
- <AuthorComments>
<AuthorN am e>Edo</AuthorN ame>
<AuthorCommentTitle>Not Provided</AuthorCommentTitle>
<AuthorCommentDateCreated>May 19, 2007</AuthorCommentDateCreated>
<AuthorCommentText>Not Provided</AuthorCommentText>
</AuthorComments>
- <DiscussionComments>
- <Comment>
<CommentAuthor>Not Provided</CommentAuthor>
<CommentDateCreated>Not Provided</CommentDateCreated>
<CommentTitle>Not Provided</CommentTitle>
<CommentText>Not Provided</CommentText>
</Comment>
</DiscussionComments>
</ComponentComments>
</ActivityNode>
- <ActivityNode engineClass="com.insightful.miner.LogisticRegressionEngineNode"
guiClass="com.insightful.miner.LogisticRegressionNodeModel" numlnputs=" 1" numOutputs=" 1"
id=,"2">
<DisplayInfo labelText="Logistic Regression (2)" defaultLabelText="Logistic Regression"
smallIcon="logistic_regression_small.gif' largelcon="logistic_regression_large.gif" x="300"
y="175" />
- <ArgumentList>
- <XTProps>
- <Property name="copyInputColumns">
<Property name="independent" value="false" />
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<Property name="dependent" value="true" />
<Property name="other" value="false" />
</Property>
- <Property name="newColumns">
<Property name="probability" value="true" />
<Property name="classification" value="true" />
<Property name="agreement" value="false" />
<Property name="probabilityFor" value="forLastCategory" />
<Property name="specifiedCategory" value = "" />
</Property>
<Property name="useGlobal" value="true" />
<Property name="specifiedRowsToChunk" value="O" />
<Property name="rowsToChunk" value="10000" />
<Property name="useCache" value="global" />
<Property name="propertiesSet" value="true" />
<Property name="includeIntercept" value="true" />
<Property name="weightedColumn" value="" />
<Property name="maxIterations" value=" 10" />
<Property name="convergenceTolerance" value="0.0001" />
<Property name="probabilityFor" value="lastCategory" />
<Property name="specifiedCategory" value="" />
- <Property name="modelSpecials">
<Property name="T core 0" value="" />
<Property name="T gas 0" value="" />
</Property>
- <Property name="columnRoles">
<Property name="HTC[Core]" value="independent" / >
<Property name="T fuel 0" value="independent" />
<Property name="Cp" value="independent" />
<Property name="Failure Cladding" value="dependent" / >
</Property>
</XTProps>
</ArgumentList>
- <ComponentComments>
- <AuthorComments>
<AuthorName>Edo</AuthorName>
<AuthorCommentTitle>Not Provided</AuthorCommentTitle>
<AuthorCommentDateCreated>May 19, 2007</AuthorCommentDateCreated>
<AuthorCommentText>Not Provided</AuthorCommentText>
</AuthorComments>
- <DiscussionComments>
- <Comment>
<CommentAuthor>Not Provided</CommentAuthor>
<CommentDateCreated>Not Provided</CommentDateCreated>
<CommentTitle>Not Provided</CommentTitle>
<CommentText>Not Provided</CommentText>
</Comment>
</DiscussionComments>
</ComponentComments>
</ActivityNode>
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- <ActivityNode engineClass="com.insightful.miner.PartitionEngineNode"
guiClass="com.insightful.miner.PartitionNodeModel" numlnputs=" " numOutputs="3" id="6">
<DisplayInfo labelText="Partition (6)" defaultLabelText="Partition"
smalllcon="partition_small.gif" largelcon="partition_large.gif ' x="160" y="175" />
<OutputPortToolTips portl="Train" port2="Test" port3="Validate" />
- <ArgumentList>
- <XTProps>
<Property name="trainSize" value="0.5" />
<Property name="testSize" value="0.5" />
<Property name="validSize" value="0.0" />
<Property name="useGlobal" value="true" />
<Property name="useCache" value="global" / >
<Property name="randomSeed" value="newSeedEveryTime" />
<Property name="randomSeedValue" value="5" / >
<Property name="specifiedRowsToChunk" value="0" />
<Property name="rowsToChunk" value=" 10000" />
</XTProps>
</ArgumentList>
- <ComponentComments>
- <AuthorComments>
<AuthorName>Edo</AuthorName>
<AuthorCommentTitle>Not Provided</AuthorCommentTitle>
<AuthorCommentDateCreated>May 19, 2007</AuthorCommentDateCreated>
<AuthorCommentText>Not Provided</AuthorCommentText>
</AuthorComments>
- <DiscussionComments>
- <Comment>
<CommentAuthor>Not Provided</CommentAuthor>
<CommentDateCreated>Not Provided</CommentDateCreated>
<CommentTitle>Not Provided</CommentTitle>
<CommentText>Not Provided</CommentText>
</Comment>
</DiscussionComments>
</ComponentComments>
</ActivityNode>
- <ActivityNode engineClass="com.insightful.miner.PredictEngineNode"
guiClass="com.insightful.miner.PredictNodeModel" numInputs="l" numOutputs="l" id=",8">
<DisplayInfo labelText="Logistic Prediction" defaultLabelText="Predict: Logistic Regression"
smalllcon="predict_small.gif' largelcon="predict_large.gif ' x="408" y="285" />
- <ArgumentList>
- <XTProps>
<Property name= "useGlobal" value="true" />
<Property name="useCache" value="global" />
<Property name="propertiesSet" value="true" />
- <Property name="newColumns">
<Property name="probability" value="true" />
<Property name="classification" value="true" />
<Property name="agreement" value="false" />
<Property name="probabilityFor" value=" forLastCategory" />
<Property name="specifiedCategory" value="0" / >
</Property>
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- <Property name="copylnputColumns">
<Property name="independent" value="false" />
<Property name="dependent" value="true" />
<Property name="other" value="false" />
</Property>
- <Property name="modellndependentVar">
<Property name="Ccore" value="true" />
<Property name="friction Corr Exp[ECCS]" value="true" / >
<Property name="htc Core" value="true" />
<Property name="htc HXC" value="true" />
<Property name="K form System[ECCS]" value="true" />
<Property name="Mass Gass" value="true" / >
<Property name="T core 0" value="true" />
<Property name="T gas 0" value="true" />
<Property name="Roughness" value="true" />
<Property name="max leakage" value="true" / >
<Property name="HTCS" value="true" />
<Property name="HTCC" value="true" />
<Property name="Rupture Form Factor" value="true" / >
<Property name="Shaft Moment Inertia" value="true" />
<Property name="C1" value="true" />
<Property name="C2" value="true" />
<Property name="C3" value="true" />
<Property name="HTC[Core]" value="true" />
<Property name="T fuel 0" value="true" />
<Property name="Cp" value="true" />
</Property>
<Property name="modelOutputType" value="classification" />
<Property name="modelAlgorithm" value="glm" />
<Property name="specifiedRowsToChunk" value="0" />
<Property name="rowsToChunk" value=" 10000" />
<Property name="modelDependentVar" value="Failure Cladding" />
</XTProps>
</ArgumentList>
<ExecuteAfter id="2" />
<ModelParent id="2" />
- <ComponentComments>
- <AuthorComments>
<AuthorName>Edo</AuthorName>
<AuthorCommentTitle>Not Provided</AuthorCommentTitle>
<AuthorCommentDateCreated>May 19, 2007</AuthorCommentDateCreated>
<AuthorCommentText>Not Provided</AuthorCommentText>
</AuthorComments>
- <DiscussionComments>
- <Comment>
<CommentAuthor>Not Provided</CommentAuthor>
<CommentDateCreated>Not Provided</CommentDateCreated>
<CommentTitle>Not Provided</CommentTitle>
<CommentText>Not Provided</CommentText>
</Comment>
</DiscussionComments>
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</ComponentComments>
</ActivityNode>
- <ActivityNode engineClass="com.insightful.miner.PredictEngineNode"
guiClass="com.insightful.miner.PredictNodeModel" numlnputs=" 1" numOutputs="1 " id=1"9">
<DisplayInfo labelText="Classification Tree Prediction" defaultLabelText="Predict:
Classification Tree" smallIcon="predict_small.gif' largelcon="predict_large.gif ' x="405"
y="435" />
- <ArgumentList>
- <XTProps>
<Property name="useGlobal" value="true" />
<Property name="useCache" value="global" />
<Property name="propertiesSet" value="true" />
- <Property name="modelIndependentVar">
<Property name="Ccore" value="true" />
<Property name="friction Corr Exp[ECCS]" value="true" />
<Property name="htc Core" value="true" />
<Property name="htc HXC" value="true" />
<Property name="K form System[ECCS]" value="true" />
<Property name="Mass Gass" value="true" />
<Property name="T core 0" value="true" />
<Property name="T gas 0" value="true" />
<Property name="Roughness" value="true" />
<Property name="max leakage" value="true" />
<Property name="HTCS" value="true" />
<Property name="Rupture Form Factor" value="true" />
<Property name="HTCC" value="true" />
<Property name="Shaft Moment Inertia" value="true" />
<Property name="C 1" value="true" />
<Property name="C3" value="true" />
<Property name="C2" value="true" />
<Property name="HTC[Core]" value="true" />
<Property name="T fuel 0" value="true" />
<Property name="Cp" value="true" />
</Property>
<Property name="modelOutputType" value="classification" />
<Property name="modelAlgorithm" value="tree" />
- <Property name="newColumns">
<Property name="probability" value="true" />
<Property name="classification" value="true" />
<Property name="agreement" value="false" />
<Property name="probabilityFor" value="forSpecifiedCategory" />
<Property name="specifiedCategory" value="l" />
</Property>
- <Property name="copyInputColumns">
<Property name="independent" value="false" />
<Property name="dependent" value="true" />
<Property name="other" value="false" />
</Property>
<Property name="modelDependentVar" value="Failure Cladding" />
</XTProps>
</ArgumentList>
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<ExecuteAfter id="l" 1"/>
<ModelParent id="l" />
- <ComponentComments>
- <AuthorComments>
<AuthorName>Edo</AuthorName>
<AuthorCommentTitle>Not Provided</AuthorCommentTitle>
<AuthorCommentDateCreated>May 19, 2007</AuthorCommentDateCreated>
<AuthorCommentText>Not Provided</AuthorCommentText>
</AuthorComments>
- <DiscussionComments>
- <Comment>
<CommentAuthor>Not Provided</CommentAuthor>
<CommentDateCreated>Not Provided</CommentDateCreated>
<CommentTitle>Not Provided</CommentTitle>
<CommentText>Not Provided</CommentText>
</Comment>
</DiscussionComments>
</ComponentComments>
</ActivityNode>
- <ActivityNode engineClass="com.insightful.miner.ClassificationAgreementEngineNode"
guiClass="com.insightful.miner.ClassificationAgreementNodeModel" numlnputs="- 1"
numOutputs="O" id="20">
<DisplayInfo labelText="Classification Agreement Table" defaultLabelText="Classification
Agreement" smallIcon="classification agreement_small.gif"
largelcon="classification_agreement_large.gif' x="655" y="265" />
<InputPortToolTips portl="Probabilities" />
- <ArgumentList>
- <XTProps>
<Property name="useGlobal" value="true" />
<Property name="useCache" value="global" />
<Property name="specifiedRowsToChunk" value="0" />
<Property name="rowsToChunk" value=" 10000" />
- <Property name="inputs">
- <Property name="#0">
<Property name="useRole" value="true" />
<Property name="fitted" value="true" />
<Property name="depColumn" value="" / >
<Property name="evalColumn" value = "" />
</Property>
- <Property name="#1">
<Property name="useRole" value="true" />
<Property name="fitted" value="true" />
<Property name="depColumn" value="" / >
<Property name="evalColumn" value="" />
</Property>
</Property>
</XTProps>
</ArgumentList>
- <ComponentComments>
- <AuthorComments>
<AuthorName>Edo</AuthorName>
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<AuthorCommentTitle>Not Provided</AuthorCommentTitle>
<AuthorCommentDateCreated>May 25, 2007</AuthorCommentDateCreated>
<AuthorCommentText>Not Provided</AuthorCommentText>
</AuthorComments>
- <DiscussionComments>
- <Comment>
<CommentAuthor>Not Provided</CommentAuthor>
<CommentDateCreated>Not Provided</CommentDateCreated>
<CommentTitle>Not Provided</CommentTitle>
<CommentText>Not Provided</CommentText>
</Comment>
</DiscussionComments>
</ComponentComments>
</ActivityNode>
- <ActivityNode engineClass="com.insightful.miner.ClassificationAssessmentEngineNode"
guiClass="com.insightful.miner.ClassificationAssessmentNodeModel" numInputs="- 1"
numOutputs="O" id="221">
<DisplayInfo labelText="Lift Chart" defaultLabelText="Lift Chart"
smalllcon="lift chart_small.gif' largelcon="lift_chart_large.gif ' x="661" y="375" />
<InputPortToolTips portl="Classifications" />
- <ArgumentList>
- <XTProps>
<Property name="useGlobal" value="true" />
<Property name="useCache" value="global" />
<Property name="specifiedRowsToChunk" value="O" />
<Property name="rowsToChunk" value="10000" />
- <Property name="inputs">
- <Property name="#0">
<Property name="useRole" value="true" />
<Property name="fitted" value="true" />
<Property name="depColumn" value = "" />
<Property name="evalColumn" value = "" />
</Property>
- <Property name="# 1">
<Property name="useRole" value="true" />
<Property name="fitted" value="true" />
<Property name="depColumn" value = "" />
<Property name="evalColumn" value= "" />
</Property>
</Property>
</XTProps>
</ArgumentList>
- <ComponentComments>
- <AuthorComments>
<AuthorName>Edo</AuthorName>
<AuthorCommentTitle>Not Provided</AuthorCommentTitle>
<AuthorCommentDateCreated>May 25, 2007</AuthorCommentDateCreated>
<AuthorCommentText>Not Provided</AuthorCommentText>
</AuthorComments>
- <DiscussionComments>
- <Comment>
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<CommentAuthor>Not Provided</CommentAuthor>
<CommentDateCreated>Not Provided</CommentDateCreated>
<CommentTitle>Not Provided</CommentTitle>
<CommentText>Not Provided</CommentText>
</Comment>
</DiscussionComments>
</ComponentComments>
</ActivityNode>
</ActivityNodeList>
<TextNodeList />
<CollapsedNodeList />
- <LinkList>
<Link fromNode="9" fromPort="O" toNode="21" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<Link fromNode="8" fromPort="O" toNode="21" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<Link fromNode="9" fromPort="O" toNode="20" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<Link fromNode="8" fromPort="O" toNode="20" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<Link fromNode="O" fromPort=""O" toNode="6" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<Link fromNode="6" fromPort="O" toNode="2" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<ModelLink fromNode="2" fromPort="O" toNode="8" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<Link fromNode="6" fromPort="l" toNode="8" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<Link fromNode="6" fromPort="O" toNode="l" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<ModelLink fromNode="l" fromPort="O" toNode="9" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
<Link fromNode="6" fromPort=" l" toNode="9" toPort="O" orthogonal="false" />
</LinkList>
</Worksheet>
</IMML>
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8.4 Appendix D: Linear and Non Linear Models used for Example III
The code reported below is created by means of the Vensim Software by Ventana Systems.
Number of Realizations=
100
Inputs[input number]=
10,10,10,10,10
input number:
inputl, input2, input3, input4, input5
Linear Weighted Sum Inputs[input number]=
Inputs[input number]*weights[input number]
"Non-Linear Weighted Sum Inputs"[input number]=
(Inputs [input number])* weights [input number]
Output Linear=
SUM(Linear Weighted Sum Inputs[input number!])
Output Non Linear =
(SUM("Non-Linear Weighted Sum Inputs"[input number!]))^2
weights[input number]=
0.5,0.5, 0.5, 0.5, 0.5
Failure Criterionl =
14
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Failure Criterion2=
250
SM1=
-Output Linear+Failure Criterionl
SM2=
-Output Non Linear+Failure Criterion2
Failure Counter 1=
IF THEN ELSE(SM1>0,0,1)
Failure Counter 2=
IF THEN ELSE(SM2>0,0,1)
Cumulative Number of Failures 1=INTEG(
Failure Counter 1,0)
Cumulative Number of Failures 2=INTEG(
Failure Counter 2,0)
.Control
FINAL TIME = 100
S Second
S The final time for the simulation.
INITIAL TIME = 0
Second
The initial time for the simulation.
TIME STEP = SAVEPER = 1 Second [0,?] The time step for the simulation.
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